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L Introduction
In Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank,' the Supreme Court shocked
the securities industry.2 On its own motion, the Court questioned and then
abolished the aiding and abetting cause of action for securities fraud under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).3 The Court's holding
overruled thirty years of lower court precedent.
Congress enacted the 1934 Act and the Securities Act of 1933 (1933
Act)4 after the stock market crash of 1929. The 1933 Act is narrower in
coverage than the 1934 Act, which reflected Congress's effort to regulate all
aspects of securities trading.5 Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act is a general
antifraud provision that imposes civil liability on those who commit
manipulative or deceptive acts in comiection with the purchase or sale of
securities.' For over thirty years, lower federal courts routinely allowed
1. 114S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
2. See David S. Ruder, The Future of Aiding and Abetting and Rule 10b-5 After
Central Bank of Denver, 49 Bus. LAw. 1479, 1479 (1994) (stating that Supreme Court's
decision in Central Bank marked dramatic event in history of interpretation of Rule lOb-5);
Joel Seligman, The Implications of Central Bank, 49 Bus. LAw. 1429, 1430 (1994) (touting
Central Bank decision as most important federal securities decision in years). See generally
Chairman of SEC Vows to Protect Investors, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, July 23, 1994, at A7
(discussing testimony by SEC Chairmen in response to Central Bank decision); Sharon
Walsh, Congress, SEC Ponder Shareholder Lawsuits, WASH. POST, May 11, 1994, at D1
(describing reaction by defendants' and plaintiffs' lawyers to Central Bank decision); Thom
Weidlich, Professionals Still at Risk. Plaintiffs' Bar Shifts Gears to Revise Claims in Central
Bank's Wake, NAT'L L.J., July 18, 1994, at A4 (discussing plaintiffs' bar's response to
Central Bank).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
4. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
5. See THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAw OF SEcuRIms REGULATION § 1.2, at 7-8 (2d ed.
1990) (noting that 1933 Act covers only distributions of securities and that investor protection
extends only to purchasers of securities, while 1934 Act regulates all aspects of public trading
of securities).
6. See infra note 14 (providing text of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15
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victims of manipulative or deceptive acts to recover not only against those
who themselves violated Section 10(b), but also against those who aided and
abetted the Section 10(b) violation.7 Despite the history of the aiding and
abetting cause of action, the Supreme Court in Central Bank concluded that
aiding and abetting fell outside the text of Section 10(b). After Central
Bank, therefore, courts can no longer allow Section 10(b) recovery for
aiding and abetting a Section 10(b) violation.
Central Bank sends a clear message: While courts may sometimes
imply a private cause of action to penalize conduct that Congress has
expressly proscribed, courts may not imply a cause of action creating liabil-
ity for conduct that Congress has not expressly proscribed. Thus,, Central
Bank not only abolished the private cause of action for aiding and abet-
ting under Section 10(b); Central Bank also instituted a new methodology
for evaluating all implied causes of action. For example, lower federal
courts have routinely recognized claims of conspiracy8 and vicarious
liability9 under Section 10(b) as well as aiding and abetting under the Racke-
teer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). ° Each cause of
action creates liability for conduct that Congress has not expressly pro-
scribed. Thus, Central Bank raises serious questions about the continued
vitality of these implied causes of action.
Central Bank also affects the interaction among various participants in
the American system of government. The Supreme Court, in effect, insists
that Congress directly decide and expressly state where and when it wishes
to penalize aiding and abetting conduct. Moreover, those with strong
opinions about the appropriateness of aiding and abetting claims may no
longer speak as litigants and amlcus curiae; they now must shift their debate
to Congress. Finally, civil plaintiffs must refocus their legal claim and
present different facts in order to sustain a claim under Section 10(b).
U.S.C. § 78j (1988)); see also ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 8.9, at 309 (1986)
(stating that Congress designed § 10(b) as catchall provision and characterizing § 10(b) as
most open-ended and important provision m 1934 Act); HAZEN, supra note 5, § 1.2, at 8
(stating that § 10(b) is general provision that'bars fraud and material misstatements or
omissions of material facts m connection with any purchase or sale of securities).
7 See mfra note 29 (citing cases involving aiding and abetting liability); see also infra
notes 21-25 and accompanying text (describing differences between primary and secondary
liability).
8. See infra notes 129-35 (discussing conspiracy claims under § 10(b)).
9. See infra notes 157-70 (discussing vicarious liability under § 10(b)).
10. See tnfra notes 198-203 (discussing implication of aiding and abetting under
RICO).
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Part II of this Note reviews the background of aiding and abetting under
Section 10(b) and discusses the Central Bank decision." Part Il examines
Central Bank's effects on other implied causes of action. 2 Part IV describes
the impact Central Bank has had and will continue to have on congressional
debates and securities litigants and proposes a tactic that Congress should
follow if it chooses to override Central Bank. 3 Finally, Part V suggests
that, while certain aspects of the Central Bank decision deserve criticism,
events since Central Bank demonstrate that with this particular securities
issue, Congress, not the Court, is the better branch to resolve the dispute.
H. The Central Bank Decision
A. The Implied Cause of Action Under Section 10(b)
The aiding and abetting cause of action under Section 10(b) makes sense
only against the background of Section 10(b)'s text and its interpretations by
federal courts. The text of Section 10(b) does not expressly create a private
cause of action. 4 However, federal courts traditionally have filled the inter-
11. See mfra notes 14-124 and accompanying text (discussing aiding and abetting under
§ 10O(b) and Central Bank decision).
12. See mfra notes 125-217 and accompanying text (examining effects that Central Bank
will have on other implied causes of action).
13. See infra notes 218-58 and accompanying text (describing current congressional
debate over Central Bank and suggesting strategy for Congress).
14. See the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988), which
provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Section 10(b) does not, by itself, seem to proscribe anything; it simply makes it unlawful to
violate Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules. See CLARK, supra note 6, § 8.9,
at 309 (noting that § 10(b) does not prohibit anything unless there is SEC rule implementing
it); Steve Thel, The Onginal Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42
STAN. L. REv 385, 387 n.10 (1990) (commenting that § 10(b) is not self-executing).
Consequently, SEC Rule 10b-5 is relevant. See Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive
Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
1390
CEAITRAL BANK
stices of federal statutes in the name of effectuating congressional intent. 5
Accordingly, in 1946, the Umted States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that Section 10(b) contained an implied private
cause of action that allowed private citizens to bring civil suits against
violators of Section 10(b).16 Twenty-five years later, the Supreme Court
confirmed the existence of an implied private cause of action under Section
10(b) in Supenntendent of Insurance v Bankers Lfe & Casualty Co 17 The
Supreme Court concluded that injured private individuals could rightfully sue
violators of Section 10(b) even though Congress did not expressly provide
for 10(b) civil liability 18
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security
This Note will refer only to § 10(b); this reference implies the inclusion of Rule 10b-5.
15. See Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689-94 (1979) (implying
private cause of action under Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (1988), and commenting that doing so effectuated Congress's intent to create broad
remedial scheme); .I. Case Co. v Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964) (implying private
cause of action under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988),
and commenting that Court had duty to imply remedy to preserve Congress's chief purpose
of protecting investors); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.3, at
353, 358 (2d ed. 1994) (describing Court's willingness to imply private cause of action or
create federal law to further congressional intent).
16. See Kardon v National Gypsum Co., 69 F Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946)
(applying common-law tort principles and concluding that when person disregards commands
of statute that person commits wrongful act and tort). In Kardon, the district court considered
whether a private individual had a cause of action pursuant to § 10(b) to enforce its text. Id.
at 513. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants participated in certain fraudulent misrepre-
sentations and suppressions of truth which induced plaintiffs to sell their stock to defendants
for less than the stock's true value. Id. The district court noted that without question the
complaint set forth sufficient facts to show a violation of § 10(b). Id. The court acknowl-
edged that § 10(b) did not expressly allow a civil suit by persons injured as a result of § 10(b)
violations. Id. The district court, however, considered the whole statute and its broad
remedial purpose and concluded that it could imply a private cause of action under § 10(b).
Id. at 514.
17 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
18. Superintendent of Ins. v Bankers-Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971)
(confirming implied private cause of action under § 10(b) with virtually no discussion). In
Supenntendent, the Court addressed whether § 10(b) protected a seller of bonds from fraud
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Originally, courts advanced two separate grounds to justify the implied
cause of action for damages under Section 10(b). First, courts stated that the
implied cause of action would effectuate congressional intent.19 Second,
courts invoked the common-law tort principle that, "where a right exists, a
remedy exists."20 In effect, the courts concluded that actors who engage in
the central acts proscribed by Section 10(b) are primarily liable for that
violation.2'
Additionally, courts extended liability for conduct not expressly pro-
hibited by Section 10(b) by adhering to the common-law theory of secondary
liability 22 Secondary liability differs from primary liability in one signifi-
cant respect: Primary liability involves a violation of the text of the statute;
and deceit. Id. at 7 The complaint alleged that Bankers Life & Casualty Co., among others,
deceived Manhattan, the seller of Treasury bonds, into authorizing the sale by misrepresent-
ing that the sale proceeds would be of equal value with a certificate of deposit that Bankers
Life and others gave to Manhattan in exchange for the bonds. Id. at 7-8 & n. 1. The Court
concluded that § 10(b)'s text protected Manhattan from any manipulative or deceptive
devices. Id. at 9. The Court recognized that implication of a private right of action under
§ 10(b) was appropriate. Id. at 13 n.9 The Court remanded the case for trial providing no
opinion on the merits but held that § 10(b) provided Manhattan with a cause of action. Id.
at 13-14.
19 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (noting that
implication of private cause of action under § 10(b) was consistent with general recognition
that private enforcement supplements SEC action in terms of protecting investors); Kardon,
69 F Supp. at 514 (noting that 1934 Act has broad purpose of regulating securities trans-
actions; therefore, mere omission of express provision for civil liability was not sufficient to
negate what general law implies).
20. See Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196-97 (1976) (noting that
although there was no indication that Congress contemplated private remedy under § 10(b),
§ 10(b) created right and courts had firmly established private cause of action to enforce that
right); Kardon, 69 F Supp. at 513 (citing ancient maxim which means "where a right exists,
a remedy exists"); see also Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (noting
that essence of civil liberty consists in right of every injured individual to claim protection
of laws and stating that it is duty of government to afford that protection); Daniel R. Fischel,
Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAL. L. REv 80,
80 (1981) (describing origins of implied right of action under § 10(b)).
21. See William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws -
Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law Pnnciples
and the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CoRp L. 313, 318 (1988) (noting that courts classify those
who engage in central act proscribed by statute as primary violators).
22. See Fischel, supra note 20, at 80 (noting that lower federal courts relied on criminal
and tort common-law doctrines when imposing secondary liability); Kuehnle, supra note 21,
at 315 (acknowledging that Congress did not expressly provide for secondary liability in




secondary liability does not.' Thus, a defendant can be secondarily liable
for a violation of Section 10(b) by having a close relationship with the
primary violator,2' even though the defendant did not engage in conduct
proscribed by Section 10(b).
B. Aiding and Abetting
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana,
in Brennan v Midwestern Life Insurance,' was the first court to find a
defendant who did not engage in conduct prohibited by the text of Section
10(b) secondarily liable because of the defendant's close relationship to the
primary violator.' The Brennan court created 10(b) liability based on the
23. See Fischel, supra note 20, at 80 (drawing distinction between primary and
secondary liability and noting that defendant may be secondarily liable for actions of primary
violator if defendant had close enough relationship to primary violator). See generally Ralph
C. Ferrara & Diane Sanger, Derivative Liability in Securities Law: Controlling Person
Liability, Respondeat Superior, and Aiding and Abetting, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv 1007
(1983) (providing overview of manner m which judicial and administrative decisions have
balanced congressional intent with common law m areas of controlling person liability,
respondeat superior, and aiding and abetting liability); J. Michael Gottesman, Brokers'
Derivative Liability: Does Supervision Make a Difference?, 41 BRooK. L. Rav 181 (1974)
(examining relationship between statutory and common-law basis for liability under securities
laws); Kuehmle, supra note 21 (discussing secondary liability based on aiding and abetting,
conspiracy, and respondeat superior under securities laws); David S. Ruder, Multiple
Defendants m Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pan Delicto,
Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv 597 (1972) (describing common-
law elements underlying courts' decisions concerning secondary liability under securities
laws).
24. See mfra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (describing nature of "close relation-
ship" that creates secondary liability m defendant).
25. See Kuehnle, supra note 21, at 318 (stating that secondary violator does not engage
m central act proscribed by statute but assists or supports primary violator's act and therefore
is liable because of relationship with primary violator).
26. 259 F Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
27 See Brennan v Midwestern Life Ins., 259 F Supp. 673, 681 (N.D. Ind. 1966)
(allowing plaintiff to assert cause of action against defendant based on theory of secondary
liability), aftd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). The Bren-
nan court addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff had an implied cause of action for aiding
and abetting under § 10(b). Id. at 675-76. Plaintiff alleged that Dobich Securities Corp.
was a principal violator of § 10(b). Id. at 675. Dobich, while m bankruptcy, allegedly
used stock purchase money as working capital for speculation and other improper pur-
poses and then fraudulently misrepresented to plaintiffs the reasons for the delays m the
delivery of the purchased shares of stock. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants knew of
Dobich's activities and failed to report Dobich's activities to the proper authorities. Id.
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common-law tort theory that a defendant who aided and abetted a primary
violator was secondarily liable even though the defendant's conduct did not
violate the text of Section 10(b).Y After the Brennan decision, all twelve
circuits acknowledged the existence of a cause of action for aiding and
abetting under Section 10(b).29 The Supreme Court did not refute or
reinforce the lower federal courts' assumption that a valid claim existed for
aiding and abetting under Section 10(b); instead, prior to Central Bank, the
Court specifically reserved judgment on the question.' °
Further, plaintiffs contended that defendants knowingly and purposely encouraged an artificial
build-up in the market of its stock. Id. As a result, plaintiffs asserted that defendants were
in a more favorable position and that defendants' officers and directors realized substantial
personal profit from the sale of the stock. Id. In Brennan, the district court referred to other
§ 10(b) cases in which the SEC asserted claims based on aiding and abetting. Id. at 677 The
district court considered the legislative history of § 10(b), but noted that it shed little light
on the congressional understanding of the applicability of § 10(b) to aiders and abettors. Id.
The court referred to the Restatement of Torts and concluded that tort principles best ful-
filled the purposes of the 1934 Act. Id. at 680. Consequently, the district court recognized
an aiding and abetting cause of action under § 10(b) based on the premise that it should
read the 1934 Act flexibly m order to implement the 1934 Act's policies and purposes. Id.
at 681.
28. See id. at 681 (recognizing implied cause of action for aiding and abetting).
29. See, e.g., Farlow v Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir.
1992) (outlining elements that plaintiff must allege to establish secondary liability m defendant
as alder and abettor under § 10(b)); K & S Partnership v Continental Bank, 952 F.2d 971,
977 (8th Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2993 (1992); Levine v Diamanthuset,
Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Schatz v Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 495
(4th Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992); Fine v American Solar King
Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 300 (5th Cir. 1990) (same), cert. dismissed sub nom. Hurdman v Fine,
502 U.S. 976 (1991); Schlifke v Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 947 (7th Cir. 1989) (same);
Schneberger v Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477, 1480 (11th Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1091 (1989); Zoelsch v Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(suggesting that aiding and abetting claim exists under § 10(b)); Moore v Fenex, Inc., 809
F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir.) (outlining elements that plaintiff must allege to establish secondary
liability m defendant as alder and abettor under § 10(b)), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987);
Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983) (same); International Inv Trust
v Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980) (same); Monsen v Consolidated Dressed Beef
Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978).
30. See Herman & MacLean v Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.5 (1983) (reserving
question of whether courts could imply cause of action for aiding and abetting under § 10(b)).
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff
could not sustain a § 10(b) claim by alleging only that the defendant was negligent in his or
her participation in the deceit, manipulation, or fraud. Id. at 193. The Hoclifelder Court
concluded that the plaintiff had not proven the required level of intent. Id. at 214-15. The
Court, therefore, noted that it was unnecessary to consider whether civil liability for aiding
and abetting existed under § 10(b). Id. at 191 n.7
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Common-law tort principles guided lower federal courts in fixing the
parameters of aiding and abetting actions.3' Thus, courts extended sec-
ondary liability to all defendants if plaintiffs showed that (1) someone other
than the accused aider-abettor violated the text of Section 10(b), (2) the
accused aider-abettor had general awareness of the impropriety of his
conduct, and (3) the accused alder-abettor substantially assisted the primary
wrongdoer. 32 Consequently, lower federal courts transformed common-law
elements for aiding and abetting into a cause of action that extended 10(b)
liability to those other than the primary violators.33
While twelve circuits recognized a private aiding and abetting cause of
action and generally applied a similar test, some differences remained.' For
31. See Ruder, supra note 23, at 620 (noting that tort theory is fertile source of doctrine
under § 10(b)). Professor Ruder specifically referred to § 876 of the Restatement of Torts.
Id. Section 876 provided courts with a source of liability for secondary defendants and
outlined three elements that plaintiffs had to satisfy before courts would impose liability Id.
The elements outlined m § 876 served as the basis for the three-part test that courts used when
confronted with a clain that the defendant was secondarily liable. Section 876 stated that a
person is liable if he:
(a) orders or induces such conduct, knowing of the conditions under which the
act is done or intending the consequences which ensue, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and
his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third
person.
RESTATEMENT Op TORTS § 876 (1939).
32. See, e.g., Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir.
1992) (applying tort common-law elements of aiding and abetting); K & S Partnership v
Continental Bank, 952 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2993
(1992); Levine v Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Schatz
v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 495 (4th Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992);
Fine v American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 300 (5th Cir. 1990) (same), cert.
dismissed sub nom. Hurdinan v Fine, 502 U.S. 976 (1991); Schlifke v Seafirst Corp., 866
F.2d 935, 947 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); Schneberger v Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477, 1480 (11th
Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989); Moore v Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297,
303 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Cleary v Perfectune, Inc., 700
F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983) (same); International Inv Trust v Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909,
922 (2d Cir. 1980) (same); Monsen v Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799
(3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978).
33. Compare supra note 31 (outlining common-law test courts used when confronted
with clain that defendant was secondarily liable) with supra note 32 and accompanying text
.(describing elements that courts used when deciding whether defendant aided and abetted
primary violator).
34. Hearing on Abandonment of the Private Right of Action and for Aiding and Abetting
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example, every circuit considered "substantial assistance" an element of
Section 10(b) aiding and abetting liability ' Different courts, however,
characterized "substantial assistance" m slightly different ways. 6 These
Securities Fraud/Staff Report on Private Securities Litigation Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. 77-78 (1994) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (prepared statement of David S. Ruder,
Professor of Law, Northwestern University, Former Chairman of the SEC 1987-1989)
(noting that while courts had generally imposed aiding and abetting liability in consistent
manner prior to Central Bank, some areas of doubt existed).
35. See, e.g., Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir.
1992) (requiring plaintiff to show that defendant substantially assisted primary wrongdoer
before extending 10(b) liability based on claim of aiding and abetting); K & S Partnership v
Continental Bank, 952 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2993
(1993); Levine v Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Schatz
v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 495 (4th Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992);
Fine v American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 300 (5th Cir. 1990) (same), cert. dis-
missed sub nom. Hurdman v. Fine, 502 U.S. 976 (1991); Schlifke v Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d
935, 947 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); Schneberger v Wheeler, 859,F.2d 1477, 1480 (11th Cir.
1988) (same), cert. demed, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989); Moore v Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303
(6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Cleary v Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d
774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983) (same); International Inv Trust v Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d
Cir. 1980) (same); Monsen v Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978).
36. See, e.g., Camp v Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that substan-
tial causal connection must exist between culpable conduct of alleged aider and abettor and
harm to plamtifi); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 497 (4th Cir. 1991) (requiring plaintiff
to prove that defendant rendered "substantial assistance" to primary securities law violation,
not merely to person committing violation), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992); Moore v
Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303-04 (6th Cir.) (distinguishing cases involving nondisclosure
and requiring plaintiff to show that aider and abettor consciously intended to provide aid by
proving either culpable state of mind or conduct from which court or jury could infer culpable
state of mind), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Woods v Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004,
1009-10 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (determining whether substantial assistance existed based upon all
circumstances surrounding transaction in question); International Inv Trust v Cornfeld, 619
F.2d 909, 922, 925-27 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that courts were still delineating exact content
of phrase "substantial assistance," but that there may exist nexus between degree of scienter
and requirement that alleged aider and abettor rendered "substantial assistance"); Monsen v
Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir.) (inaction may constitute
substantial assistance when plaintiff demonstrates that aider and abettor consciously intended
to assist in perpetration of wrongful act), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); Woodward v
Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975) (commenting that "substantiality" of assistance
is function of all circumstances). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
also required the plaintiff to prove that the defendant substantially assisted the primary
offender. This requirement, however, was not as important in the Seventh Circuit as in other
circuits because the Seventh Circuit imposed aider and abettor liability only when the plaintiff
showed that the aider and abettor's conduct met all the elements for primary liability except
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variations occurred because Section 10(b) does not prohibit "substantial
assistance" of a primary violation.37 Courts, therefore, lacked textual guid-
ance as to precisely what conduct amounted to "substantial assistance."3
Courts tended to focus on different factors, so predicting what would consti-
tute substantial assistance m any one case became difficult. For example,
some courts focused on whether a causal connection existed between the
defendant's action or inaction and the plaintiff's harm.39 Others focused on
whether the defendant had a duty to disclose the primary violator's activities
to the plaintiff.4' Additionally, courts struggled to isolate the precise state
of mind required in order to sustain a claim of aiding and abetting against
the defendant. Although most lower courts adjusted the required intent
according to whether the accused alder and abettor had a fiduciary duty to
that the aider and abettor had not actually sold the securities. See Barker v Henderson,
Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 495-96 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that plaintiff must
show that each alleged aider and abettor committed "manipulative or deceptive" acts or
otherwise met standards of direct liability, except plaintiff does not have to show that defend-
ant offered or sold securities).
37 Compare note 14 (providing text of § 10(b), which makes no mention of prohibited
conduct encompassing "substantial assistance") with notes 35-40 and accompanying text
(including "substantial assistance" as element of aiding and abetting cause of action under
§ 10(b)).
38. See Brief for Petitioner at 17, Central Bank v First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct.
1439 (1994) (No. 92-854) (noting that while each court of appeals addressed "substantial
assistance" issue, there was little uniformity in courts' application of "substantial assistance"
standard).
39. See Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 462 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that affirmative acts
will only constitute substantial assistance if there is substantial causal connection between
these acts and harm suffered by plaintiff); Moore v Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303-04 (6th
Cir.) (noting that in cases involving nondisclosure, plaintiffs must show that defendant con-
sciously intended for silence to aid securities law violation), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006
(1987); Woods v Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1012-13 (11th Cir. 1985) (concluding that
alleged aider and abettor's atypical business action was causal factor in perpetration of fraud
and therefore finding substantial assistance); Woodward v Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th
Cir. 1975) (noting that if evidence shows no more than transaction constituting routine
activities, court would not find § 10(b) liability without clear proof of intent to violate securi-
ties laws); Landy v FDIC, 486 E.2d 139, 163 (3d Cir. 1973) (referring to Restatement of
Torts and explaining that "substantial assistance" may occur if encouragement or assistance
is substantial factor in causing resulting tort), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
40. See Schatz v Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 455, 496-97 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that in
absence of duty to disclose primary violator's action, defendant's inaction cannot constitute
substantial assistance), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992); International Inv Trust v Corn-
feld, 619 F.2d 909, 927 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that generally inaction can create aiding and
abetting liability only when there is conscious or reckless violation of independent duty to
act).
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disclose or act,41 a minority of courts discarded this inquiry and asked simply




In Central Bank, the plaintiffs did not allege that the court should find
Central Bank primarily liable for violating the text of Section 10(b).43
Instead, the plaintiffs sought to make Central Bank secondarily liable based
on a claim that Central Bank aided and abetted the Section 10(b) violation.'4
The plaintiff argued that three main actors participated in the transactions
that led to the suit in Central Bank: the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Pub-
lic Building Authority (Authority), the developer of Stetson Hills (Devel-
oper), and the Central Bank of Denver (Central Bank).
The Authority wanted to make public improvements in a planned resi-
dential and commercial development in Colorado Springs, Colorado.45 The
41. See, e.g., Camp v Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 463 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that because
defendant owed no duty of disclosure to plaintiff, showing of recklessness did not satisfy
knowledge requirement); Schatz, 943 F.2d at 496 (noting that degree of knowledge required
for aiding and abetting liability turns on whether defendant owed duty to plaintiff); Woods
v Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11th Cir. 1985) (requiring plaintiff to prove defend-
ant's conscious intent to provide assistance to violation when defendant owed no duty to
disclose); Cleary v Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983) (same); Armstrong
v McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that if alleged aider and abettor owes
fiduciary duty to plaintiff, recklessness is enough; otherwise, assistance rendered must be
knowing and substantial); Walck v American Stock Exch., 687 F.2d 778, 791 (3d Cir. 1982)
(requiring plaintiff to show that defendant had actual knowledge of § 10(b) violation when
defendant lacked fiduciary duty to plaintiff), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 942 (1983); see also Joel
S. Feldman, The Breakdown of Securities Fraud Aiding and Abetting Liability: Can a Uniform
Standard Be Resurrected?, 19 SEc. REG. L.J. 45, 53-57 (1991) (describing scienter require-
ment employed by majority of circuits).
42. See First Interstate Bank v Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 899 (10th Cir. 1992) (rejecting
notion that absent duty to disclose, silence or inaction cannot be basis for aiding and abetting
liability), rev'd sub nom. Central Bank v First Interstate, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994). In Pnng,
the court of appeals placed emphasis on whether the alleged aider and abettor would benefit
from silence instead of categorically stating that silence or inaction can never be a basis for
aiding and abetting liability Id., see also Levine v Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478,
1484 (9th Cir. 1991) (inferring substantial assistance.from defendant's actions, not because
defendant's assistance aided in retention of investors, but because prospective investors relied
on defendant's confirmations).





Authority had to raise capital to reimburse the Developer for the cost of the
public improvements. 46 By issuing bonds in 1986 and 1988, the Authority
*raised a total of $26 million.47
In an effort to increase the attractiveness of the bonds to investors, the
Authority offered a bond indenture4 that included several provisions de-
signed to protect investors. First, landowner assessment liens on the
Colorado Springs property secured the bonds.49 Second, the bond indenture
required that the value of the land subject to the liens equal at least 160% of
the bonds' outstanding principal and interest (160% test).' Third, the bond
indenture named Central Bank as the indenture trustee for the bond issues. 5'
Finally, the bond indenture required the Developer to provide Central Bank
with an annual appraisal verifying that the land subject to the liens met the
160% test.5
In 1986, the land subject to the liens met the 160% test. In January
1988, while proposing to secure the 1988 bonds, the Developer provided
Central Bank with an appraisal of the same land that secured the 1986
bonds.53 According to the Developer's 1988 appraisal, the land values re-
mained virtually unchanged from the 1986 appraisal and thus the property
appeared to meet the 160% test.'" Shortly after receiving the Developer's
1988 appraisal, however, Central Bank became concerned about the ap-
praisal's accuracy Central Bank's concern stemmed from comments made
46. Pnng, 969 F.2d at 893.
47 Id.
48. Black's Law Dictionary defines "bond indenture" as a contract between the issuer of
the bonds and the bondholders. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 181 (6th ed. 1991).
49. Black's Law Dictionary defines "assessment" as a determination as to the value of
property and "lien" as a charge against the property that secures performance of an obli-
gation. Id. at 116, 922 (defimng assessment and lien respectively). Therefore, with the
bonds at issue in Central Bank, the bondholders' security was dependent on the value of the
property.
50. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1443.
51. Black's Law Dictionary defines "indenture trustee" as a person or entity charged
with carrying out the terms of the bond indenture. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 770 (6th ed.
1991). The theory behind the appointment of an indenture trustee is-that the trustee will be
an impartial party who can mediate and resolve conflicts between the issuer of the bonds and
the bondholders who may at times have adverse interests. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R.
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 300, at 837-38 (3d ed. 1983) (discussing
requirement that bond indenture name trustee as protector of investors).
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by the senior underwriter for the 1986 bonds. 55 The senior underwriter in-
formed Central Bank that property values in Colorado Springs had de-
creased. More significantly, the senior underwriter stated that the Devel-
oper's appraisal was sixteen months old and that therefore the senior under-
writer doubted that the appraisal accurately reflected the property's value.56
Because the bond indenture named Central Bank as indenture trustee,
Central Bank expressed concern that the Developer had violated the 160%
test. Central Bank first consulted with an rn-house appraiser about the
Developer's 1988 appraisal.' The rn-house appraiser agreed with the senior
underwriter that the appraisal appeared optimistic and suggested that Central
Bank retain an outside appraiser to conduct an independent review 18 In light
of the apparent inaccuracy of the Developer's appraisal, Central Bank, as
indenture trustee, required that an independent appraiser review the
Developer's 1988 appraisal.59
Before the independent appraiser conducted the review, Central Bank
met with representatives of the Developer and the Authority to determine
why the Developer's appraisal did not show a decline in land values from the
1986 appraisal. 6° The Developer responded that the real estate values
reflected $10 million worth of improvements to the property that offset any
decline in real estate value. 6 The bond indenture gave Central Bank, as
indenture trustee, the discretionary power to demand an independent review
of the Developer's appraisal. 62 After hearing the Developer's explanation,
however, Central Bank agreed to delay the independent review until the end
of 1988, approximately six months after the closing on the 1988 bond
issue. 63 The Authority defaulted on the 1988 bonds before the independent
review took place?'
After the Authority's default, First Interstate Bank of Denver (First
Interstate) and two 1988 bondholders sued the Developer and Central Bank,





59. First Interstate Bank v Prmg, 969 F.2d 891, 894 (1992), rev'd sub nom. Central
Bank v First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 894 n.6.
62. Id. at 894.
63. Id. at 895.
64. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1443.
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1934 Act.' First Interstate did not allege that Central Bank was the primary
violator of Section 10(b).' Instead, First Interstate alleged that the Devel-
oper was a primary violator of Section 10(b) because the Developer fraudu-
lently inflated the value of the Colorado real estate that the Authority used
to secure the municipal bonds. 7 First Interstate alleged that Central Bank
was secondarily liable because Central Bank knowingly or recklessly aided
and abetted the Section 10(b) violation by deciding to postpone the mdepen-
dent review of the appraisal until after the Authority issued the 1988 bonds.68
2. The Supreme Court Decision
While lower federal courts were developing a federal common law
aiding and abetting liability under Section 10(b), the Supreme Court was
developing its own method of statutory interpretation of securities statutes.69
The Court diminished the emphasis on common-law principles"0 and the
65. See supra note 14 (providing text of § 10(b)).
66. See Warren v Reserve Fund, Inc., 728 F.2d 741, 744 (5th Cir. 1984) (outlining.
elements of primary liability under § 10(b)). Warren provides an example of the elements
that a plaintiff must establish before courts will impose primary liability under § 10(b). The
plaintiff must establish: (1) a misrepresentation, omission, or other fraudulent device, (2) a
purchase or sale of securities m connection with the fraudulent device, (3) scienter by
defendant in making the misrepresentation or omission, (4) materiality of the misrepre-
sentation or omission, (5) justifiable reliance on the fraudulent device by plaintiff; and
(6) damages resulting from the fraudulent device. Id.
67 Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1443.
68. See Petitioner's Brief at 8, Central Bank, (No. 92-854); see also supra notes 22-33
and accompanying text (discussing distinction between secondary and primary liability and
aiding and abetting claim).
69. See generally H. Miles Foy, M, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and
Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REv 501 (1986)
(discussing Court's movement from presumption in favor of implying remedies to approach
focusing more strictly on congressional intent); Thomas L. Hazen, Implied Private Remedies
Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium - Civil Rights, Securities
Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REV 1333 (1980) (discussing Supreme Court's criteria
development and clarification when faced with question of whether implied right exists under
statute); H. Peter Haveles, Jr., Note, An Analytical Framework for Implied Causes of Action:
Section 17 of the Securities Exchange Act and Redington v Touche Ross & Co., 59 B.U. L.
REV 157 (1979) (discussing Supreme Court's use of clarified and refined criteria when
determining whether to imply private cause of action).
70. In Herman & MacLean v Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983), the Supreme Court
addressed whether persons seeking recovery under § 10(b) must prove their cause of action
by clear and convincing evidence rather than by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 377
In making the decision, the Court noted that "[rieference to common-law practices can be
misleading." Id. at 388. In Blue Chips Stamps v Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975),
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effectuation of Congress's broad remedial purposes; instead, the Court
focused on the statute's text. 71  Two decisions exemplify this interpre-
tive shift: J.. Case Co. v Borak7 and Touche Ross & Co. v Redington.3
Both cases involved the 1934 Act, and in both cases the plaintiffs argued that
the statute implied a private cause of action.
In Borak,74 the Court addressed the issue of whether a violation of
Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act entitled a shareholder to a private cause of
action for damages.75 Essentially, Section 14(a) states that an individual
violates the law when he solicits proxies in violation of the rules the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prescribes.76 The Borak Court con-
ceded that Section 14(a)'s text made no specific reference to a private cause
of action.' The Court stated, however, that because Congress adopted
Section 14(a) primarily to protect investors, the Court had a duty to provide
remedies necessary to effectuate that congressional purpose.78
the Court noted that the typical fact situation in which the classic tort of misrepresentation and
deceit evolved was extremely different from the world of commercial transactions to which
Rule lob-5 is applicable. Id. at 744-45.
71. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text (describing Supreme Court's em-
phasis on statute's language when deciding whether to imply private cause of action).
72. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
73. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
74. .1. Case Co. v Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In Borak, the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether it was appropriate to imply a private cause of action under § 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988). Id. at 427 A stockholder of
.I. Case Co. (Case) brought the civil suit. Id. The stockholder objected to a merger
between Case and another company Id. The stockholder alleged that those proposing the
merger circulated a false and misleading proxy statement in violation of § 14(a). Id. at 428.
The Court noted that § 14(a) did not specifically grant the private stockholder the right to
enforce § 14(a) by bringing a civil suit. Id. 432. The Borak Court, however, relied on the
overall purpose of the 1934 Act and concluded that it should imply a private cause of action
when the remedies would further the congressional purpose. Id. at 432-33.
75. See the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988), which
states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of any national securities
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any
proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an
exempted security) registered pursuant to Section 781 of this title.
76. See supra note 75 (providing text of § 14(a)).
77. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432.
78. Id. at 432-33; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 6.3, at 359 (discussing Borak
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Fifteen years later m Redington,79 the Supreme Court considered
whether Section 17(a) of the 1934 Act implied a private cause of action for
damages."° Section 17(a) established record-keeping requirements for ex-
changes, brokers, and dealers.81 Like Section 14(a), Section 17(a)'s text did
not expressly provide for a private cause of action.A Instead of emphasizing
the 1934 Act's broad purpose to protect investors, however, the Redington
decision and noting that Borak approach allows federal courts to create private cause of action
if damage suits would help accomplish legislative purpose of statute).
79. Touche Ross & Co. v Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (979). The Redington Court
determined whether it could imply a private cause of action under § 17(a) of the 1934 Act
so that private customers could bring a civil suit for damages against those who violated the
requirements of § 17(a). Id. at 562. Section 17(a) established record-keeping require-
ments for exchanges, brokers, and dealers. See lnfra note 80 (providing text of § 17(a)).
Weis Securities, Inc. (Weis), a securities brokerage firm, retained Touche Ross & Co.
(Touche Ross) to serve as Weis's independent certified public accountant. Redington,
442 U.S. at 563. The case arose out of Weis's insolvency and liquidation. Id. at 564. The
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPQ) and the appointed trustee in the liquida-
tion of the Weis business filed an action for damages against Touche Ross for conducting an
improper audit and certification of Weis's financial statements. Id. at 565-66. Along with
other claims, SIPC and the trustee alleged that Touche Ross violated § 17(a). Id. at 566.
The Redington Court noted that SIPC's argument in favor of implying a private cause of
action based on tort principles-was not persuasive. Id. at 586. The Court analyzed
§ 17(a) and concluded that Congress did not intend to create a private cause of action. Id.
at 568-78. Consequently, the Court concluded it would not create an implied cause of action.
Id. at 579.
80. At the time relevant to the Redington decision, Securities Exchange Act § 17(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970), read as follows:
Every national securities exchange, every member thereof, every broker or
dealer who transacts a business in securities through the medium of any such
member, every registered securities association, and every broker or dealer
registered pursuant to section 78o of this title, shall make, keep, and pre-
serve for such periods, such accounts, correspondence, memoranda, papers,
books, and other records, and make such reports, as the Commission by its
rules and regulations may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors. Such accounts, correspondence,
memoranda, papers, books, and other records shall be subject at any time or
from time to time to such reasonable periodic, special, or other examinations
by examiners or other representatives of the Commission as the Commission
may deem necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
Congress amended § 17 of the 1934 Act after the Redington decision. Compare 15 U.S.C.
§ 78q(a) (1970) with 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1) (1988).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970).
82. Redington, 442 U.S. at 562. Compare supra note 75 (providing text of § 14(a))
with supra note 80 (providing text of § 17(a)).
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Court looked closely at Section 17(a)'s text and at what the statutory scheme
should reasonably permit.83
This different approach led the Redington Court to conclude that if
Congress did not provide investors with a private damages remedy, then the
Court would not imply one. 4 In response to the plaintiff's contention that
such a conclusion served an injustice, the Redington Court noted that even
if that were the case, the Supreme Court was the wrong forum in which to
make the injustice argument.s According to the Court, plaintiffs should
make the injustice argument before Congress - the branch at liberty to
leglslate. 86
Like Borak and Redington, Central Bank involved the 1934 Act. In
Central Bank, however, the Court faced a different issue. In Borak and
Redington, the Court decided whether an implied civil remedy existed
for private plaintiffs when defendants violated the text of Sections 14(a)
and 17(a), respectively I Central Bank did not involve a similar inquiry
because the Supreme Court had already determined that a plaintiff could
bring a private civil suit against defendants who violate the text of Sec-
tion 10(b)."8
Perhaps because of the Supreme Court's altered disposition toward im-
plied causes of action under the 1934 Act, 9 the Court on its own motion
83. See Redington, 442 U.S. at 578 (noting that generalized references to remedial
purposes of 1934 Act do not justify reading provision more broadly than its language and
statutory scheme reasonably permit).
84. Id. at 578-79; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 6.3, at 358 (noting that Court's
basic inquiry when determining whether to imply cause of action is always whether Congress
intended, explicitly or implicitly, to create private cause of action, but stating that what
constitutes sufficient evidence of intent and Court's restrictive or liberal approach to
construing that evidence have changed over time).
85. Redington, 442 U.S. at 579.
86. Id.
87 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting that when defendant violates
expressed language of statute, courts characterize defendant as primary violator).
88. See Superintendent of Ins. v Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971) (recognizing implied cause of action under § 10(b)); see also Herman & MacLean v
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (noting that existence of implied remedy under § 10(b)
was "simply beyond peradventure"); Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 452 U.S. 185, 196, 212-14
(1976) (accepting existence of private cause of action under § 10(b) and concluding that
plaintiff could not sustain § 10(b) action without allegation of scienter); Blue Chip Stamps v
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 (1975) (noting that private enforcement of § 10(b)
furthered congressional intent).
89 See supra notes 69-86 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's increasing
unwillingness to imply private causes of action under 1934 Act).
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ordered counsel to brief the issue of whether a plaintiff could create second-
ary liability under Section 10(b) based on a claim of aiding and abetting:'
The Court noted that it had confronted two main issues surrounding Sec-
tion 10(b): 9 1 the scope of the conduct prohibited by Section 10(b)F and the
requirements that a plaintiff must meet to create prinary liability under
Section 10(b).93 The Court classified the Central Bank issue as one that con-
cerned only the scope of 10(b) liability I
First Interstate and the SEC, as amicus curiae,95 advanced four argu-
ments in support of an implied private cause of action for aiding and abetting
under Section 10(b). First, they argued that the phrase "directly or
indirectly" in Section 10(b) covered aiding and abetting. 96 Second, First
Interstate and the SEC asserted that when Congress enacted the 1934 Act,
90. See Respondent's Bnef at 10, Central Bank (No. 92-854) (noting that vitality of aiding
and abetting cause of action under § 10(b) was not challenged by Central Bank or by Tenth
Circuit). Because lower courts had implied the cause of action for aiding and abetting for 30
years, Central Bank did not challenge the existence of aiding and abetting liability on appeal.
Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Instead, Central Bank appealed the
Tenth Circuit's conclusion that a showing of recklessness satisfied the scienter requirement for
aiding and abetting. Id., see also supra note 29 (listing lower court cases in which courts
allowed plaintiff to bring cause of action for aiding and abetting § 10(b) violation).
91. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1445.
92. See id. (citing as examples Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1983) (establishing
that violation of § 10(b) by corporate insiders requires showing of relationship which affords
access to inside information and taking advantage of information by trading without disclosure);
Ciarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (noting that silence in connection with
purchase or sale of securities may operate as actionable fraud under § 10(b) despite absence of
statutory language or legislative history specifically addressing legality of nondisclosure); Santa
Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-80 (1977) (refusing to extend § 10(b) to breaches
of fiduciary duty of majority against minority shareholders without charge of misrepresentation
or lack of disclosure and reasoning that to do so would bring within Rule 10b-5 wide variety of
corporate conduct traditionally left to state regulation); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 201 (1976) (refusing to impose § 10(b) liability for negligent conduct alone)).
93. See id. at 1445-46 (citing as examples Musick, Peeler & Garrett v Employers Ins.,
113 S. Ct. 2085, 2091 (1993) (holding that defendants in actions under § 10(b) had right to seek
contribution); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 357
(1991) (noting absence of statute of limitations in § 10(b) anal adopting uniform federal statute
of limitations); Basic Inc. v Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988) (requiring plaintiff in § 10(b)
action to prove reliance on defendant's misrepresentation before court will award damages);
Aaron v SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (requiring SEC to establish scienter as element of civil
enforcement action to enjoin violations of § 10(b)).
94. Id. at 1446.
95. See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text (discussing role of amcus curiae in
courts and their present role in congressional debate).
96. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447; see supra note 14 (providing text of § 10(b)).
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Congress legislated with a general understanding of tort law I They
asserted that Congress, therefore, intended to include aiding and abetting
liability under Section 10(b), even though the 1934 Act had not expressly
defined aiding and abetting.98 Third, First Interstate and the SEC argued
that Congress had silently acquiesced in the judicial interpretation of
Section 10(b) by amending the securities laws on various occasions after
lower courts recognized the aiding and abetting cause of action without
overruling this line of cases.' Finally, the SEC asserted that the aiding and
abetting cause of action deterred secondary actors from contributing to
fraudulent activities and ensured that defrauded plaintiffs received compensa-
tion. 100
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, stated that Section 10(b)'s text
defined the scope of prohibited conduct. 10' The Court construed the text
strictly and rejected First Interstate's and the SEC's argument that Section
10(b)'s phrase - "directly or indirectly" - encompassed aiding and abetting
conduct."~ The Court concluded that this interpretation of Section 10(b)
would extend liability to persons who did not engage in the activities
expressly proscribed by Congress.I0 3 For example, the Court noted that if
the Court allowed recovery for aiding and abetting under Section 10(b), a
plaintiff could create 10(b) liability without proving reliance - a critical
element for recovery under Section 10(b). ' 4 The Court reasoned that had
97 Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1450; see supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text
(discussing common-law cause of action for aiding and abetting).
98. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1450.
99 Id. at 1452.
100. Id. at 1453; see infra notes 236-38 and accompanying text (discussing fact that those
parties who wanted to affect definition of prohibited conduct under § 10(b) had to resort to
filing amicus curiae briefs).
101. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446 (commenting that Court would not permit
challenges to conduct not prohibited by text of statute); see also Felix Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv 527, 535 (1947) (commenting
that while inquiry may not end with text of statute, that is appropriate place to look initially).
102. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447-48. In Central Bank, the Court concluded that
§ 10(b)'s "directly or indirectly" phrase had a variety of meanings so that First Interstate and
the SEC failed to support the suggestion that § 10(b)'s text itself prohibited aiding and
abetting. Id. at 1448. The Court stated that aiding and abetting liability extended to persons
who did not indirectly engage in the prohibited activity, but who merely gave a degree of aid
to those who did. Id. at 1447
103. Id. at 1447-50.
104. Id. at 1449 (citing Basic Inc. v Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988)); see nfra
notes 255-57 and accompanying text (describing elements that plaintiff must prove to impose
primary liability on defendant under § 10(b)).
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Congress desired to make aiding and abetting a Section 10(b) violation,
Congress would have used the words "aid" and "abet" in the text."10
Even though the Court analyzed and based the decision on the text of
Section 10(b), the Court examined and rejected the other arguments. In
response to First Interstate's and the SEC's assertion that the 1934 Congress
legislated with a general understanding of the common law of torts, the
Court noted that such a general assertion could not support the theory that
Congress specifically intended to impose aiding and abetting liability under
Section 10(b). 11 The Court concluded that Congress decided instead when
to impose aiding and abetting and other forms of secondary liability on a
statute-by-statute basis."° The Court concluded, therefore, that Congress
deliberately had chosen to create secondary liability in some contexts and not
in others."8 The Court stated that the judiciary should not interfere with this
congressional choice. 09
The Court summarily dismissed First Interstate's and the SEC's argu-
ment that Congress silently acquiesced in the lower courts' implication of
aiding and abetting liability under Section 10(b). The Court stated that con-
gressional inaction could not expand the scope of a duly enacted statute."'
105. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448. Unlike the lower federal courts that implied an
aiding and abetting cause of action despite the absence of the exact words, the Supreme Court
concluded that the absence of the words "aid" and "abet" resolved the case. Id. Additionally,
the Court noted that had the text of § 10(b) not resolved the issue, the Court would have
attempted to infer how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue. Id. The Court
stated that it would have looked to the other expressed causes of action in the 1934 Act as a
model for the § 10(b) action. Id. In Central Bank, the Court concluded that because Con-
gress did not attach private aiding and abetting liability to any other express provision, Con-
gress similarly would not have attached aiding and abetting liability to § 10(b). Id. at 1448.
106. See itd. at 1450 (surveying common-law basis of aiding and abetting and concluding
that existence and application of aiding and abetting was uncertain).
107 Id. at 1450-52. The Central Bank Court noted that while Congress had enacted a
general aiding and abetting statute applicable to all federal criminal offenses, Congress had
not enacted a civil counterpart. Id. at 1450. The Court specifically considered § 20(a) of the
1934 Act, which imposes liability on controlling persons who control any person liable under
other provisions of the 1934 Act. Id. at 1451-52; see infra notes 163-70 and accompanying
text (providing text and discussion of § 20(a)). The Court concluded that the fact that
Congress chose to impose some forms of secondary liability, while not imposing others,
indicated a deliberate congressional choice with which the Court should not interfere. Central
Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1452.
108. Central Bank, 114S. Ct. at 1451-52.
109. Id. at 1452; see supra note 107 (describing Court's comparison of § 10(b) with
other statutes).
110. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453 (referring to U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 for
proposition that there is only one proper way in which Congress may enact statute); see
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Finally, the Court addressed the SEC's contention that aiding and abetting
liability deterred secondary actors from contributing to fraudulent activities
and ensured that participants in the Section 10(b) violation make the de-
frauded party whole."' While conceding that aiding and abetting liability
expanded the civil remedy, the Court concluded that the uncertainties sur-
rounding the rules of aiding and abetting had rippling effects."' For ex-
ample, the Court suggested that entities exposed to secondary liability as
aiders and abettors might abandon substantial defenses and pay settlements
rather than face the risks of a trial.' The Court theorized that such costs
might create difficulties for smaller companies in obtaining advice from pro-
fessionals who have been traditional targets of aiding and abetting claims. 4
While the Supreme Court's view of the other arguments offered by First
Interstate and the SEC may provide insight into the resolution of future
cases, the significance of the decision lies in the majority's heavy emphasis
on the actual text of and statutory structure surrounding Section 10(b). Al-
though the Court made reference to the intentions of the 1934 Congress, '
the Court determined the scope of Section 10(b) by adhering primarily to a
"plain statement" policy That is, by refusing to extend Section 10(b) liabil-
ity to aiders and abettors and by emphasizing the absence of the words "aid"
and "abet" in the text, the Court sent an unambiguous message to Congress:
"If you intend to make this conduct actionable you must say so plainly 11116
William D. Popkin, Law-Malang Responsibility and Statutory Interpretation, 68 IND. L.J.
865, 885-86 (1993) (asserting that courts should not infer congressional intent to ratify
statute's judicial interpretation from re-enactment or inaction because legislature is often
unaware of judicial interpretation and because there are too many possible reasons for legis-
lative inaction).
111. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453-54.
112. Id. at 1454; see Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REv 553, 570-
84 (1981) (critiquing policy reasons for restricting implied causes of action for securities
violations); cf supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text (discussing confusion among circuits
as to aiding and abetting claim).
113. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1454. Defendants' tendency to settle when faced with
a claim of aiding and abetting was significant because secondary defendants were jointly and
severally liable with primary violators for any judgment rendered. See Heanng on Securities
Litigation Reform Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications & Finance of the House
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1994) [hereinafter House
Hearing] (prepared statement of Donald C. Langevoort, Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Profes-
sor of Law, Vanderbilt University) (stating that presence of joint and several liability creates
unique risks in securities litigation environment).
114. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1454.
115. Id. at 1448-50.
116. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESs: BASIC
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Justice Kennedy and four other justices emphasized the text of Section
10(b) and gave virtually no merit to the long history surrounding aiding and
abetting m the lower federal courts.11 7 For tis reason, four Justices dis-
sented. 118 Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, did not contend that the
phrase "directly or indirectly" in Section 10(b) created aiding and abetting
liability 19 Instead, he asserted that the Supreme Court had changed its
approach to unplied causes of action since Congress enacted the 1934 Act. I
Justice Stevens argued that Congress passed the 1934 Act against a backdrop
of liberal construction of remedial statutes.121 Additionally, Justice Stevens
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 1209 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P Frickey eds., 1994) (stating that judicial opinions on interpretation of statutes are
full of references and presumptions). Judicial opinions that reference presumptions, or
suggest the existence of presumptions, amount to policies of clear statement. Id. In effect,
these presumptions all say to the legislature, "[flf you mean this, you must say so plainly "
Id., see also mfra notes 223-31 and accompanying text (discussing message to Congress about
future statutes); cf. New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 431
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Dublino, Justice Marshall stated that the policy of clear
statement serves a useful purpose: It informs legislators that if they wish to alter the accom-
modations, they must clearly indicate that wish. Id. Justice Marshall reasoned that law-
makers will only clearly indicate their intent if the Court regularly adheres to the clear state-
ment policy. Id. See generally William V Luneberg, Justice Rehnquist, Statutory Inter-
pretation, the Policies of Clear Statement, and Federal Jurisdiction, 58 IND. L.J. 211 (1982)
(discussing clear statement requirement and its role in statutory interpretation).
117 CentralBank, 114 S. Ct. at 1442. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and Thomas joined Justice Kennedy's opinion.
118. Id. Justices Blackmun, Souter, and Ginsberg joined Justice Stevens's dissent.
119. See id. at 114S. Ct. at 1455-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (making no assertion that
§ 10(b)'s phrase "directly or indirectly" encompasses aiding and abetting behavior).
120. Id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that-at the time Congress
passed the 1934 Act, courts had adopted common-law presumptions that a statute enacted for
the benefit of a particular class conferred on members of that class the right to sue violators
of that statute. Id. Justice Stevens cited Piedmont &,Northern Co. v ICC, 286 U.S. 299,
311 (1932), for the proposition that just before Congress passed the 1934 Act, the Supreme
Court had stated that remedial legislation should receive a broader and more liberal
interpretation than the mere dictionary definitions of the words employed by Congress. Cen-
tral Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1457
121. CentralBank, 114 S. Ct. at 1457 Justice Stevens implied that the Supreme Court's
statutory interpretation of remedial statutes during the period in which Congress passed the
1934 Act formed part of the legal framework under which Congress operated when it wrote
the statute. Id., see Luneburg, supra note 116, at 253-54 (noting that Court should consider
legal context that existed when Congress enacted statute when Court is trying to determine
statute's meaning); see also REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATuTEs (1975). When discussing the general concept of meaning, Dickerson posed the
insightful question of whether the interpreter should determine meaning by looking from the
point of view of the lawmakers or from a member of the audience to whom the lawmakers
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pointed to the broad and long-standing acceptance of the aiding and abetting
claim in the lower federal courts and concluded that courts and individuals
had solidified the private cause of action against aiders and abettors within
the statutory scheme. " As a result, Justice Stevens took an opposite
approach from the majority's position. The majority maintained that
Congress had to state specifically its intent if it wanted to permit plaintiffs
to bring a claim for aiding and abetting under Section 10(b)."2 Justice
Stevens argued that courts should continue to imply a cause of action for
aiding and abetting unless Congress specifically stated otherwise.i24
ff1. The Central Bank Effect
In the immediate aftermath of Central Bank, a large number of lower
courts have dismissed aiding and abetting clains."z The Supreme Court's
addressed the statute. Id. at 36. Dickerson noted that the reader should consider the inten-
tions of the author (lawmakers) because otherwise the process of communication makes no
sense. Id., see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 338 (1986) (suggesting that courts
should not try to reach what courts believe is best substantive result, but rather that courts
should construct story of democratically elected legislature enacting text m particular
circumstances and that account should justify whole story, not just its ending). These
comments lend support to Justice Stevens's assertion that the Court should have considered
the legal context surrounding the passage of the 1934 Act.
122. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1458; see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 400 (1991) (noting
that Court invokes legislative inaction doctrines mainly when Court finds some indication that
there is insufficient support in Congress for overriding contested interpretation); Donna L.
Goldstein, Note, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Statutes: Congressional
Intent, Judicial Deference, or Mutual Abdication?, 50 FoRD-AM L. REv 611, 643 (1982)
(asserting that Supreme Court should treat uniform judicial recognition of implied right under
statute prior to its amendment as weighing in favor of implication because this encourages
courts to adhere to judicial precedent and thus promotes consistency in law).
123. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448; see supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text
(discussing Supreme Court's position on what Congress had to do to establish aiding and
abetting cause of action under § 10(b)).
124. CentralBank, 114 S. Ct. at 1458-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress
and not Supreme Court should alter established law surrounding private claim against aiders
and abettors under § 10(b)).
125. See, e.g., Broadview Fin., Inc. v Entech Management Servs. Corp., 859 F Supp.
444, 453 (D. Colo. 1994) (dismissing private cause of action for aiding and abetting based
on Central Bank holding); In re Checkers Sec. Litig., 858 F Supp. 1168, 1179 (M.D. Fla.
1994) (same); Schultz v Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, No. CIV.A.88-2870-JLT,
1994 WL 326376, at *3 (D. Mass. May 24, 1994) (same); Greenfield v Shuck, 856 F Supp.
705, 711 (D. Mass. 1994) (same). The Supreme Court did not explicitly foreclose the aiding
and abetting claim to the SEC; nevertheless, the SEC and lower federal courts have inter-
preted Central Bank as precluding the SEC from pursuing such claims. See Senate Hearing,
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analysis, however, not only abolishes aiding and abetting under Section
10(b) but also forces lower courts to question seriously whether other forms
of secondary liability currently recognized under Section 10(b), such as
conspiracy 26 and vicarous liabilityi" can survive after Central Bank. Addi-
tionally, Central Bank has seriously undermined lower federal courts' justifi-
cations for implying an aiding and abetting cause of action under RICO 128
A. Section 10(b)
1. Conspiracy
a. History of Conspiracy in the Lower Federal Courts
In addition to recognizing secondary liability under Section 10(b) based
on a claim of aiding and abetting, lower courts have permitted plaintiffs to
assert conspiracy claims under Section 10(b).129 Like the aiding and abetting
cause of action, conspiracy has borrowed common-law tort principles. 3 '
Conspiracy seeks to extend secondary liability to those who have formed an
agreement with another and then merely plan, assist, or encourage the active
wrongdoer.' Conspiracy, as implied under Section 10(b); is a form of
supra note 34, at 46 (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC). Chairman Levitt stated
that because other enforcement options are available, the SEC would not devote substantial
resources to litigate the question of whether Central Bank applies to the SEC's enforcement
actions. Id. Chairman Levitt noted that the SEC would generally refrain from asserting
aiding and abetting theories of liability where the statute does not expressly provide for such
claims. Id., see SEC v Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 694 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (questioning
whether SEC can pursue aiding and abetting claim m light of Central Bank); SEC v Patel,
No. 93 CIV 4603, 1994 WL 364089, at *5 n.1 (S.D.N.Y July 13, 1994) (dismissing SEC's
§ 10(b) aiding and abetting claim).
126. See infra notes 136-56 and accompanying text (examining Central Bank's impact
on conspiracy clamis under § 10(b)).
127 See infra notes 171-97 and accompanying text (applying Central Bank decision to
claims based on vicarious liability under § 10(b)).
128. See infra notes 204-17 and accompanying text (applying Central Bank decision to
aiding and abetting cause of action as currently implied under RICO).
129. See, e.g., Dasho v Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 265 (7th Cir.) (alleging
defendant joined conspiracy and took steps to assure its success), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 977
(1967); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v Dunne, 307 F.2d 242, 246 (6th Cir. 1962)
(alleging defendants conspired to violate § 10(b)); Eastwood v National Bank of Commerce,
673 F Supp. 1068, 1079 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (claiming aiding and abetting or conspiracy).
130. See 4 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIs D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COM-
MODITIES FRAUD § 8.5(540) (1970) (noting that conspiracy has tort pedigree that is similar
to aiding and abetting).
131. See W PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 46,
at 324 (5th ed. 1984) (describing common-law doctrine of conspiracy).
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secondary liability because proof of conspiracy imposes liability on a
defendant for the agreement made with and assistance given to the primary
violator, even if the defendant did not violate the text of Section 10(b).11
Because of the elements' similarity, courts have rarely drawn a
distinction between conspiracy and aiding and abetting.'33 Courts generally
impose 10(b) liability based on a claim of conspiracy if the plaintiff shows
that (1) someone other than the alleged conspirator violated the text of
Section 10(b), (2) an agreement existed between the alleged conspirator and
the primary violator to violate Section 10(b), and (3) the alleged conspirator
provided the primary violator with substantial assistance in furtherance of the
Section 10(b) violation."3 Because the claim of conspiracy closely resembles
that of aiding and abetting, plaintiffs may simply alter their complaints and
make claims of conspiracy to compensate for Central Bank and the loss of
their aiding and abetting claims.'35 The Central Bank decision, however,
should result in the dismissal not only of aiding and abetting claims but also
of conspiracy claims.
132. See id. (noting that conspiracy is form of secondary liability because mere agree-
ment to do wrong act is not enough alone to amount to tort; one of the parties m agreement
must commit tortious act).
133. See 9 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4489-90 (3d ed.
1992) (noting that recent court decisions have characterized conspiracy and aiding and
abetting as requiring same scienter); Kuehnle, supra note 21, at 321 (commenting that in civil
tort law, general concept of joint tortfeasor liability encompasses both aiding and abetting and
conspiracy); Ruder, supra note 23, at 639 (explaining that securities cases have not clearly
distinguished between charges that secondary defendant aided and abetted another person in
achieving an unlawfuil result and charges that secondary defendant conspired to help another
accomplish that unlawful result). In fact, the first case that established the implied cause of
action for aiding and abetting also used conspiracy language to sustain the complaint against
the company with which the defendants had negotiated a sale of assets. See Kardon v
National Gypsum Co., 69 F Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (using conspiracy and aiding
and abetting language when creating secondary liability in defendant).
134. See Bresson v Thomson McKinnon Sec. Inc., 641 F Supp. 338, 348 (S.D.N.Y
1986) (outlining elements of conspiracy claim); Kronfeld v First Jersey Nat'l Bank, 638 F
Supp. 1454, 1468-70 (D.N.J. 1986) (same); Hill v Equitable Bank, 599 F Supp. 1062, 1083
(D. Del. 1984) (same).
135. Compare supra note 134 and accompanying text (outlining elements of conspiracy
under § 10(b)) with supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (outlining elements of aiding
and abetting under § 10(b)); see also Halberstam v Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (distinguishing conspiracy from aiding and abetting); Decker v Massey-Ferguson,
Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that outside director may be liable as aider
and abettor or conspirator), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1178 (1983); Eastwood v National Bank
of Commerce, 673 F Supp. 1068, 1079 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (treating aider and abettor and
conspirator liability as essentially the same).
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b. Applying Central Bank to Conspiracy Claims
Past Supreme Court decisions suggest that the Court sanctions conspir-
acy claims.1 36 The Supreme Court's makeup, however, changed markedly
between the last approving reference to secondary liability m Herman &
MacLean v Huddleston3 7 and Central Bank. 31 As Central Bank makes
136. See Herman & MacLean v Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.5 (1983) (using lan-
guage that suggests Court's approval of conspiracy claim under § 10(b)); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 394 (1982) (noting that it necessarily
follows that those who participate in conspiracy to manipulate market are also subject to suit
in addition to primary violators); see also Kuehnle, supra note 21, at 317 (noting that
Supreme Court has made references that suggest that participants in conspiracy may be sub-
ject to suit under securities laws).
137 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
138. See Herman & MacLean v Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.5 (1983) (reserving
question of whether cause of action for aiding and abetting existed under § 10(b), but citing
Curran in way that one could plausibly infer that such cause existed under § 10(b)). The
Huddleston Court addressed two unrelated questions concerning § 10(b). Id. at 377 First,
the Court considered whether purchasers of registered securities who allege that defendants
defrauded them through misrepresentations m a registration statement may maintain an action
under § 10(b) even though § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988), of the 1933 Act provides an ex-
pressed remedy for that action. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 377 Second, the Court addressed
whether persons seeking recovery under § 10(b) had to prove their cause of action by clear
and convincing evidence rather than by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. In 1969, Texas
International Speedway, Inc. (MS) filed a registration statement and prospectus with the SEC
offering $4,398,900 m securities to the public. Id. TIS planned to use the proceeds to
finance the construction of a speedway. Id. TIS was not successful and filed a petition for
bankruptcy m 1970. Id. Purchasers of the securities instituted a class action suit. Id. at 378.
Plaintiffs sued the accounting firm, Herman and MacLean, among others and alleged that
defendants violated § 10(b) when defendants engaged in a fraudulent scheme to misrepresent
or conceal material facts regarding the financial conditions of TIS. Id. at 378. The Court
analyzed the purposes of the provisions under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act and concluded
that § 11 of the 1933 Act and § 10(b) of the 1934 Act address different types of wrongdoing.
Id. at 380-82. The Court, therefore, stated that it saw no reason to carve out an exception
to § 10(b) for fraud occurring m a registration statement just because the same conduct is also
actionable under § 11 of the 1933 Act. Id. at 382-83. Next, the Court noted that in typical
suits for money damages plaintiffs must prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence.
Id. at 387 The Court acknowledged that because courts had implied the cause of action
under § 10(b), Congress had obviously not prescribed the appropriate standard of proof. Id.
at 389. The Court noted that in the absence of a prescribed standard of proof, the Court must
provide one. Id. The Court noted that a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard allowed
both parties to share the risk of error m roughly equal fashion. Id. at 390. The Court
weighed the interests of both defendants and plaintiffs m a securities case and concluded that
because defrauded investors were among the individuals Congress sought to protect, investors
who could prove it was more likely than not that defendants violated § 10(b) could recover
money damages. Id.
When the Court decided Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v Curran, 456
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clear, the Court's current members appear more concerned with the text of
the securities laws and less concerned with the broad policy reasons under-
lying the passage of those statutes.'3 9 In Central Bank, the Court first
analyzed the text of Section 10(b).14" The Court stated that the problem with
aiding and abetting under Section 10(b) was the plaintiff's ability to make the
defendant liable for a Section 10(b) violation even though the defendant did
not engage m activities that Section 10(b)'s text proscribes."' The Court
presumed that if Congress intended to create aiding and abetting liability,
Congress would have used the words "aid" and "abet" m the statutory
text. 142
This logic applies with equal force to a claim of conspiracy Like an
aider and abettor, courts find a conspirator liable for a Section 10(b)
violation even if she did not violate the text of the statute.," Consequently,
courts that imply a cause of action for conspiracy allow plaintiffs to create
10(b) liability for conduct not proscribed by Congress. Using the rationale
U.S. 353 (1981), Justice Stevens wrote the Court's opinion in which Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun joined. Id. at 354. In Curran, Justice Powell wrote a dissenting
opinion in which Justices Burger, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined. Id. at 395. In the
interim between Curran and Central Bank Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Burger, and
Powell retired from the bench, while Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Souter, and Ginsberg
joined. Justice Stevens, who wrote the majority opinion in Curran and the dissent in Central
Bank, and Justice Blackmun, who joined the Central Bank dissent, were the only two justices
remaining out of the five that made up the Curran majority While Justice Stevens, in Cur-
ran, interpreted congressional inaction in the face of judicial opinions recognizing an implied
right as evidence of congressional feeling on the issue, the dissenters placed more emphasis
on deternining the intent of Congress when it enacted the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA),
7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988"& Supp. V 1993). Curran, 456 U.S. at 381-82, 394-95, 395-409;
see Luneberg, supra note 116, at 260-61 (discussing dissenters' position in Curran). The
Central Bank majority's method of statutory interpretation appears more closely aligned with
the Curran dissent rather than the Curran majority Compare the method of statutory inter-
pretation in Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1445-53, with the dissent in Curran, 456 U.S. at
395-404 (Powell, J., dissenting).
139. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text (describing Court's use of clear
statement approach in Central Bank).
140. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447 (commenting that statutory text of § 10(b)
controls definition of conduct prohibited by § 10(b)); see also Frankfurter, supra note 101,
at 535 (commenting that when interpreting statute, judges should initially look to words of
that statute).
141. See CentralBank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447-48 (rejecting notion that word "indirectly" in
§ 10(b) reached persons who aid and abet because by definition one could aid and abet with-
out violating expressed provisions).
142. Id. at 1448.
143. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (describing elements of conspiracy).
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of Central Bank, if Congress wanted to extend Section 10(b) to include
secondary liability based on a theory of conspiracy, Congress would have
used the word "conspiracy" in Section 10(b)'s text.
While the Court noted that Section 10(b)'s text resolved the question of
whether the Court could imply a cause of action for aiding and abetting, 45
the majority supported the Central Bank decision on other fronts. The Court
pointed out that Congress had taken a statute-by-statute approach when
imposing secondary liability for aiding and abettng. '46 For example,
Congress enacted a general aiding and abetting statute applicable to all
federal criminal offenses, 47 yet no corollary general civil aiding and abetting
statute exists.1 48 Consequently, the Court interpreted Congress's actions as
a deliberate choice to exclude civil aiding and abetting liability 149 The Court
stated that the judicial branch should respect this congressional choice.'50
Similarly, Congress enacted a general conspiracy statute applicable to all
federal criminal offenses,' 5' but like the criminal aiding and abetting statute,
144. Cf. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448 (noting that if Congress wanted to create
secondary liability based on aiding and abetting under § 10(b), Congress could have used
words "aid" and "abet" in statute).
145. Id. at 1448.
146. Id. at 1451.
147 See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988), which provides:
(a) whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him
or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a
principal.
148. CentralBank, 114 S. Ct. at 1450. The Central Bank Court also referred to § 20(a)
of the 1934 Act, which imposes controlling person liability, a form of secondary liability, on
defendants. Id. at 1451-52; see infra notes 163-67 and accompanying text (describing
§ 20(a)). The Court applied the interpretational principle that the expression of one thing
implies the exclusion of another and concluded that when Congress wished to create sec-
ondary liability, it knew how to and did so. Id. at 1452 (citing Pinter v Dahl, 486 U.S. 622,
650 (1988)); see also Goldstein, supra note 122, at 648-50 (discussing interpretative prin-
ciple - congressional expression of one thing means congressional exclusion of another -
and congressional silence).
149. Central Bank, 114S. Ct. at 1452.
150. Id., see Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpreta-
tion in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV L. REV 892, 895-96 (1982) (noting that Court has
extended maxim's exclusion-by-implication logic to resolve complex statutory issues and to
find that express provision of remedy in one statute signifies congressional intent to exclude
that remedy from other statute lacking similar express provision).
151. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which states,
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
1415
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1387 (1995)
it also lacks a civil counterpart. If Congress's choice about aiding and abet-
tmg deserves the Court's respect, that same respect should preclude further
implication of conspiracy under Section 10(b).
Finally, the Central Bank majority opinion noted that litigation m the
securities area demands a degree of certainty and predictability "5 The
Court reasoned that expansive undefined liability under Section 10(b) caused
secondary actors to incur substantial expenses for pretrial defense and
settlements.'53 The Court suggested that professionals would m turn pass
these expenses to the company's investors and thereby harm the intended
beneficiaries of the statute. 154 The uncertainty surrounding conspiracy
appears even greater than the uncertainty surrounding aiding and abetting
because an alleged conspirator may be liable for actions that occurred before
or after the alleged conspirator joined the conspiracy '55 Accordingly, each
justification given by the Supreme Court in support of the Central Bank
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both
152. CentralBank, 114S. Ct. at 1454.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1454, see also Frankel, supra note 112, at 570 (suggesting that private com-
pensatory action under securities statutes may actually hamper central purposes of those
statutes). Professor Frankel commented that the costs of private enforcement under § 10(b)
fell not only on defendants, but also on investors, consumers, and society at large. Id. at 577
Frankel reasoned that when a corporation pays a judgment or settlement, the value of the
corporation's stock may fall and cost of capital rise. Id. Thus, Frankel argued that not only
do shareholders lose but the firm's productivity may decline at some cost to society Id. at
577-78. Furthermore, Professor Frankel suggested that the broad scope of liability may deter
the issuance of public securities and hinder investment. Id. at 578.
155. See United States v Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting that even
if defendants did not participate in later events of conspiracy, they are still responsible for its
actions in furtherance of initial goal); Herpich v Wilder, 430 F.2d 818, 819 (5th Cir. 1970)
(holding defendant, who had committed overt acts in furtherance of conspiracy between
himself and third parties to violate securities laws, responsible for acts of co-conspirators in
furtherance of scheme, although defendant had to some extent departed scene), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 947 (1971); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v Dunne, 307 F.2d 242, 249 (6th Cir.
1962) (stating that conspiracy did not terminate when bonds were sold but instead stating that
fraud permeated and affected entire issue of bonds even though there was no privity between
plaintiff and defendants); Frankel, supra note 112, at 575 (noting that uncertainty as to
existence and magnitude of liability creates powerful incentive for defendant in private securi-
ties action to settle claims against him without trial on merits); cf. Kuehnle, supra note 21,
at 344 n. 167 (remarking that conspiracy has certain advantages with regard to damages and
procedure because under conspiracy rule courts can hold co-conspirator liable for action taken
before he joined conspiracy).
1416
CENTRAL BANK
decision applies with equal force to conspiracy Conspiracy claims under




a. History of Vicarious Liability in the Lower Federal Courts
Much like the common-law principles that support the Section 10(b)
cause of action for aiding and abetting, common-law tort and agency
principles provide the basis for another form of secondary liability -
respondeat superior, which is a form of vicarious.liability '17 The common
law defines vicarious liability as a tort doctrine that allocates loss based on
policy considerations." Because an employer derives a benefit from em-
ployees, the doctrine of respondeat superior maintains that the law should
hold the employer liable for the tortious actions of the employees, even if the
employer acts without fault. 159  The common-law principles of agency,
156. Some district courts have already taken the lead and dismissed conspiracy claims
because of Central Bank. See In re Medimmune, Inc. See. Litig., 873 F Supp. 953, 964 (D.
Md. 1995); In re Rasterops Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C-93-20349, 1994 WL 618970, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 1994).
157 See 2 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 130, § 5.10(100) (1983) (stating that
respondeat superior is common-law concept that means that master is liable m certain cases
for wrongful acts of servant, and that principal is liable for those of agent); see also Fischel,
supra note 20, at 86-87 (noting that plaintiffs use common-law theory of respondeat superior
to create broader liability than that provided by 1934 Act). See generally Jennifer H. Arlen
& William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability For Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evi-
dence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691 (1992) (making policy arguments for why respondeat super-
ior should not exist); William J. Fitzpatrick & Ronald T. Carman, Respondeat Superior and
the Federal Securities Laws: A Round Peg in a Square Hole, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV 1 (1983)
(discussing interaction between common-law principles of respondeat superior and liability
under securities acts); Kuehnle, supra note 21, at 348-76 (encouraging courts' use of
common-law principles to extend liability to secondary participants in securities violations).
158. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 131, § 69, at 500 (discussing policy justifications
underlying vicarious liability); Ferrara & Sanger, supra note 23, at 1017 (noting that
respondeat superior represents policy determination to allocate risk of loss to employer,
rather than to innocent victim of employee's misconduct, because employer can absorb
monetary loss as cost of doing business).
159. SeeKEETONErAL., supra note 131, § 69, at 499-500. Keeton cited several policy
reasons for enforcing the doctrine of vicarious liability. Id. at 500. The employer has en-
gaged in a business which will at some time harm others through the torts of her employees.
Id. The theory is that the employer, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear
the costs of the injury caused by the employee. Id. On a more cynical note, Keeton noted
that the reason for the employers' liability is so that the plaintiff may recover damages from
a deep pocket. (citation omitted) Id., see also Ferrara & Sanger, supra note 23, at 1016-17
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however, qualify the respondeat supenor doctrine. The law imposes liabili-
ty on employers for the employee's tortious act only if the act occurred
within the scope of the employee's employment"W and the employee acted
with apparent authority 161
Just as the 1934 Act does not expressly create a private cause of ac-
tion for aiding and abetting, the 1934 Act does not expressly create this
common-law form of vicarious liability 162 Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act,
however, does create "controlling person liability," which is itself a form of
secondary or vicarious liability 163 Section 20(a) makes controlling parties
jointly and severally liable for the controlled person's violations of the 1934
Act, including violations of Section 10(b). 'I While Section 20(a) creates a
form of secondary liability, one important distinction exists between the
liability created by Section 20(a) and that created by the common-law
(noting that principal justification underlying respondeat supenor is that employer hires and
controls employee and expects to profit from employee, so employer should bear burden of
employee's wrongful conduct); Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 157, at 27 (reciting various
rationales for vicarious liability doctrine including: (1) principal's ability to bear economic
loss involved, (2) principal's act of placing agent in position to commit tortious act, and
(3) principal's ability to control person or entity that committed tortious act).
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 219 (1958) (stating that master is subject
to liability for torts of servant committed while acting m scope of servant's employment).
161. See id. § 265 (stating that master or other principal is subject to liability for torts
that result from reliance upon, or belief in, statements or other conduct within agent's appar-
ent authority).
162. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) (including no provision that creates aiding and abetting or strict vicarious
liability).
163. See the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988), which
provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any
person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person
acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation or cause of action.
See also 2 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 130, § 5.10(100) (stating that two legal
theories exist under which courts may hold employers vicariously or secondarily liable for
legal violations of their employees under federal securities law: respondeat supenor and con-
trolling person); Fischel, supra note 20, at 86 (noting that § 20(a) imposes liability on control-
ling persons who control pnmary wrongdoer).
164. See Ferrara & Sanger, supra note 23, at 1007-08 n.4 (noting that § 20(a) includes
secondary liability for violations of broad antifraud provision of § 10(b)); see also supra note
14 (providing text of § 10(b)).
1418
CENTRAL BANK
doctrine of respondeat supenor 165 Section 20(a) expressly provides relief
from liability when the controlling person shows he acted in good faith."
In contrast, common-law agency principles do not relieve the principal from
liability even when the principal acted in good faith. 167
Although Section 20(a) provides a good-faith safe harbor for controlling
persons who would otherwise be vicariously liable for the controlled
person's violations of the 1934 Act, eight circuits have concluded that
Section 20(a) does not preclude courts from recognizing liability based on
the common-law doctrine of respondeat supenor 168 Another circuit has
165. See Kuehnle, supra note 21, at 349 (recogmzmg similarity between coverage of
agent-principal relationship and controlling person provision, but noting that controlling
person provision provides for expressed relief from liability in situations where liability based
on agent-principal relationship does not).
166. See supra note 163 (providing relevant text of § 20(a)); see also Ferrara & Sanger,
supra note 23, at 1012 (commenting that defendant can avoid liability under § 20(a) if defend-
ant shows that she acted m good faith and did not directly or indirectly engage in acts consti-
tuting violations); Fischel, supra note 20, at 86 (commenting that § 20(a)'s good-faith defense
shields person from liability if that person exercised reasonable internal supervision against
securities violation).
167 See Jackson v Bache & Co., 381 F Supp. 71, 94 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (noting that
agency principles of respondeat superior differ significantly from § 20(a) liability because
once plaintiff establishes appropriate agency relationship, liability on part of principal is
absolute - no good-faith defense is available); Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 157, at 11
(noting that § 20(a)'s good-faith defense becomes irrelevant when courts apply common-law
theory of respondeat superior because employer incurs liability for actions of employee if
action occurred within scope of employee's employment); Gottesman, supra note 23, at 185-
86 (noting that agency law imposes personal liability on innocent principal because respondeat
superior theory distributes loss based on commercial and social policy justifications).
Compare supra note 163 (providing text of § 20(a)) with supra notes 160-61 (reciting agency
principles).
168. See Hollinger v Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1577-78 (9th Cir. 1990)
(affirming applicability of common-law vicarious liability for suits under Securities Acts),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991); In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 32-34
(1st Cir. 1986) (providing reasons for concluding that § 20(a) does not preclude imposition
of common-law vicarious liability), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1072 (1987); Commerford v
Olson, 794 F.2d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir. 1986) (concluding that Congress did not mean § 20(a)
to narrow defenses to cases otherwise governed by traditional agency principles); Henrickson
v. Hennckson, 640 F.2d 880, 887 (7th Cir.) (noting that doctrine of respondeat superior was
independent of and potentially broader than § 20(a) liability), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097
(1981); Paul F Newton & Co. v Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1119 (5th Cir.
1980) (concluding that respondeat superior remains viable in actions brought under 1934 Act
and provides means of imposing secondary liability for violations of 1934 Act independent
of § 20(a)); Marbury Management, Inc. v Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.) (noting that
when respondeat superior principles apply, special good-faith defense afforded by last clause
of § 20(a) is unavailable), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Holloway v Howerdd, 536
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applied the more encompassing common-law theory of respondeat superior
but has failed to address its relationship to Section 20(a).' 69 Only two
circuits question the availability of the common-law theory of respondeat
supenor because of Section 20(a)'s good-faith defense.170
b Applying Central Bank to Vicarious Liability
When the Court decided that an implied cause of action for aiding
and abetting did not exist under Section 10(b), the Court focused solely
on Section 10(b)'s text.'7 Because aiding and abetting was outside the con-
F.2d 690, 695 (6th Cir. 1976) (contending that Congress did not intend Securities Acts to
preempt doctrine of respondeat superior in cases involving unlawful activities by brokerage
firm's employees).
Congress carved the Eleventh Circuit out of the Fifth Circuit on October 1, 1981. Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994.
In Bonner v. City of Pnchard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981), the Eleventh Circuit held that
decisions of the Fifth Circuit decided before October 1, 1981 are binding precedent. Id. at
1207 Therefore, while the Eleventh Circuit has not had an opportunity to address this issue,
according to Bonner, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Paul F Newton & Co. is binding.
169. See Kerbs v Fall River Indus., 502 F.2d 731, 740-41 (10th Cir. 1974) (extending
liability to Fall River Industries for actions of company president because president was acting
within scope of his apparent authority when he violated § 10(b)).
170. See Rochez Bros. v Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884-85 (3d Cir. 1975) (stating that
legislative history of § 20(a) and § 20(a)'s good-faith defense illustrate that Congress intended
defendant's liability to derive from something besides control, like culpable participation),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976). The Third Circuit applies the general rule that § 20(a)
limits employer liability, but has been willing to make exceptions. See Sharp v Coopers &
Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 1981) (permitting exceptions to general prohibition
against vicarious liability for accounting firms that render investment oriented opinion
letters), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).
Two lines of authority exist in the Fourth Circuit. See 2 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra
note 130, § 5.10(230)(3) (commenting that there are two lines of authority m Fourth Circuit).
In one case, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the 1934 Congress intended to impose liability
only on those who fall within § 20(a)'s definition of control and not on those defendants
whom plaintiffs could reach only with a claim based on common-law vicarious liability.
Carpenter v Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388, 394 (4th Cir.) (concluding that § 20(a)'s
history demonstrated that Congress had rejected insurer's liability standard for controlling
persons), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979). The Fourth Circuit made this decision,
however, without overruling two earlier Fourth Circuit cases that recognized common-law
vicarious liability See Carras v Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 260-61 (4th Cir. 1975) (noting that
well-settled principles of agency supported claim of vicarious liability); Johns Hopkins Univ
v Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1130 (4th Cir. 1970) (stating that Congress did not intend § 15 of
1933 Act (which is analogous to § 20 of 1934 Act) to insulate employers from tort and agency
principles of liability for misdeeds of employees), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
171. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446 (beginning analysis with text of statute); see
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duct expressly proscribed by the text of Section 10(b), the Court refused
to imply a cause of action for that conduct."7 Nothing m the Central Bank
decision suggests that the Court intended to linut this strict textual approach
to the aiding and abetting claim. Consequently, the decision may force
lower courts to apply the same strict analysis to all inplied causes of action
that extend liability to conduct beyond that proscribed by the text of the
statute.
Lower courts must confront the question of whether Central Bank limits
plaintiffs to the confines of Section 20(a) or whether, instead, plaintiffs may
still reach secondary defendants with the implied common-law doctrine of
respondeat superior 173 The common-law doctrine of respondeat superior
potentially imposes liability on a defendant for a broader range of conduct
than Section 20(a) because defendants in a common-law action cannot rely
on Section 20(a)'s good-faith defense.'74 For example, a majority of circuits
allow a plaintiff to pursue the common-law claim of vicarious liability and
hold a controlling person vicariously liable for the controlled person's viola-
tion of Section 10(b). 175 This is so even if the controlling person had a good-
also Frankfurter, supra note 101, at 535 (noting that statutory interpretation should begin with
analysis of text).
172. See Central Bank 114 S. Ct. at 1447-48 (commenting that § 10(b)'s phrase "direct-
ly or indirectly" does not encompass aiding and abetting conduct).
173. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text (discussing text of and liability under
§ 20(a)).
174. See Fischel, supra note 20, at 86 (recommending that to preclude employers from
relying on § 20(a)'s good-faith defense, plaintiffs sue defendants under § 10(b) using theory
of respondeat superior); Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 157, at 2 (noting that when firm
faces § 10(b) fraud claim and demonstrates good-faith defense in accordance with § 20(a),
imposing liability under respondeat superior effectively nullifies exculpatory provisions of
§ 20(a)).
175. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1577-78 (9th Cir. 1990)
(affirming applicability of vicarious liability for suits under Securities Acts), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 976 (1991); Commerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir. 1986) (agreeing with
other circuits that Congress did not intend § 20(a) to narrow defenses to cases otherwise
governed by traditional agency principles); In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc., 784 F.2d
29, 32-34 (1st Cir. 1986) (concluding that § 20(a) does not preclude imposition of common-
law vicarious liability), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1072 (1987); Henrickson v Henrickson, 640
F.2d 880, 887 (7th Cir.) (noting that doctrine of respondeat superior was independent of and
potentially broader than § 20(a) liability), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981); Paul F
Newton&Co. v Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1119 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding
that respondeat superior remains viable in actions brought under 1934 Act and provides
means of imposing secondary liability for violations of Act independent of § 20(a)); Marbury
Management, Inc., v Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d, Cir.) (noting that when respondeat
superior principles apply, special good-faith defense afforded by last clause of § 20(a) is
1421
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1387 (1995)
faith defense and hence Section 20(a)'s good-faith provision would seem to
provide immunity 76 Thus, an umplied cause of action under the common-
law doctrine of respondeat supenor allows a plaintiff to hold a defendant
liable even though neither Section 10(b) nor Section 20(a) encompasses the
defendant's conduct. A textual analysis similar to that performed by the
Court in Central Bank strongly suggests that courts should no longer impose
vicarious liability when the defendant presents a good-faith defense.1"
Otherwise, defendants would face liability for conduct not expressly pro-
scribed by Congress - exactly the result Central Bank rejected. 178
Although the Court m Central Bank based its decision on the statu-
tory text, the Court noted that had the text not resolved the issue, the Court
would have attempted to determine how the 1934 Congress would have
addressed the issue. 179  Examining the legislative history and comparing
the provision in question with other provisions passed at the time presents
one way to determine the intent of the enacting Congress. '" Section 20(a) is
closely linked to another controlling person provision - Section 15 of
the 1933 Act.'8 ' When Congress enacted Section 15 in 1933, that section
unavailable), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980).
176. See Gottesman, supra note 23, at 187 (noting that if courts import respondeat super-
ior doctrine to determine liability under securities laws, courts impose liability for employees'
securities law violations without regard to good-faith defenses).
177 See Central'Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446-48 (analyzing text of § 10(b) and determining
that Congress did not intend to include aiding and abetting liability under that text).
178. See id. at 1448 (rejecting aiding and abetting claim because it encompassed conduct
broader than text of § 10(b)). But see American Tel. & Tel. Co. v Winback & Conserve
Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1430-31 (3d Cir. 1994) (suggesting that basing liability on
agency theories is not expanding category of affirmative conduct proscribed by relevant
statute, instead it is deciding on whose shoulders to place responsibility for conduct indis-
putably proscribed by relevant statute), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1838 (1995); Patrick J.
McNulty, Central Bank of Denver v First Interstate Bank of Denver: The End of Aiding and
Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b), 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 847, 858 (1994) (noting that
respondeat superior is legal maxim for imposing liability on one based on one's legal
relationship to another who has committed violation of certain rule and therefore respondeat
superior does not involve determination of breadth of prohibited conduct).
179. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448; see supra note 105 (describing additional
rationale provided by Court in support of its decision m Central Bank).
180. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448-50 (analyzing other provisions in 1934 Act
in effort to support Court's position that 1934 Congress did not intend for § 10(b) to include
aiding and abetting liability); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v Gilbertson, 501
U.S. 350, 359 (1991) (noting that Court can receive clear indication of how Congress would
handle policy considerations by looking at same Congress's actions in similar and related
provisions).
181. Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988); see Ferrara & Sanger, supra
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contained no defense to liability and therefore resembled the common-
law theory of strict vicarious liability "s In 1934, Congress amended Sec-
tion 15 to include a good-faith defense."s6 Congress simultaneously adopted
Section 20(a), wich also contained a good-faith defense. 'I
In rejecting the notion that secondary liability existed under the theory
of aiding and abetting, the Supreme Court referred to Section 20(a) of
the 1934 Act."6 The Court noted that the imposition of liability on con-
trolling persons was a form of secondary liability 16 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that the 1934 Congress had the skill and experience to create
secondary liability at will."s When discussing Congress's intent with regard
to the respondeat supenor doctrine, one could draw a similar analogy be-
tween Section 15, as originally enacted,"6 and the amended Section 15189 and
Section 20(a). 1 That is, Congress had the skill and experience to impose
strict vicarious liability, but chose in the alternative to alter this liability
by adding the good-faith defense.' 9 ' Thus, as the Court stated in Central
note 23, at 1009 (noting that Congress modeled § 20(a) on § 15 and that courts tend to
interpret these sections analogously); Fischel, supra note 20, at 86 (stating that § 15 of 1933
Act and § 20(a) of 1934 Act each impose liability on persons who control primary wrong-
doer); Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 157, at 23 (noting that congressional intent under-
lying § 15 of 1933 Act was equally relevant in interpreting legislative intent underlying
§ 20(a) of 1934 Act).
182. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, § 15, 48 Stat. 74, 84 (1934) (including
no defense to controlling person liability); Fitzpatrick & Carmen, supra note 157, at 23
(noting that Congress originally enacted § 15 without "good-faith defense" clause).
183. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, § 15, 48 Stat. 74, 84 (1933), as amended
by Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291., § 208, 48 Stat. 881, 908 (1934)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988)).
184. See supra note 163 (providing text of § 20(a)); see also S. REP No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1934) (including good-faith defense in § 20(a)); H.R. REP No. 1838,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1934) (same).
185. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1451-52.
186. Id.
187 Id. at 1452 (citing Touche Ross & Co. v Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979)).
188. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, § 15, 48 Stat. 74, 84.
189. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, § 15, 48 Stat. 74, 84, as amended by
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, § 208, 48 Stat. 881, 908 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988)).
190. See supra note 163 (providing text of § 20(a)).
191. See 2 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 130, § 5.10(220) (stating that courts
have interpreted legislative history and text of §§ 15 and 20(a) in different ways in course of
dealing with coexistence or preemption in context of common-law secondary or vicarious
liability under federal securities laws). Compare Fischel, supra note 20, at 86-87 (noting that
courts that impose strict vicarious liability under respondeat superior theory effectively elim-
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Bank, this deliberate congressional choice deserves the respect of the
judiciary 192
Some commentators disagree with this interpretation of the, legislative
history underlying Sections 15 and 20(a). 193 The general argument against
the conclusion that Sections 15 and 20(a) preempt common-law vicarious
liability is that from a policy standpoint, the 1934 Congress could not have
intended to create liability that was narrower than that which existed at
common law 194 This policy argument.is persuasive but becomes irrelevant
When the Court adheres to a strict textual analysis like that employed in
mate good-faith defense provided by statute) and Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 157, at
22-23 (acknowledging that legislative history of controlling person provisions does not direct-
ly provide insight into whether Congress intended respondeat superior to be supplement to
controlling provisions of federal securities laws, but placing emphasis on fact that Congress
originally enacted § 15 without good-faith defense and then added good-faith defense to §§ 15
and 20 and thus asserting that Congress intended to restrict scope of liability, not expand it)
with Ferrara & Sanger, supra note 23, at 1015 (commenting that Congress enacted §§ 15 and
20(a) against background of existing common law and asserting that Congress therefore did
not intend federal securities laws to replace existing law) and Gottesman, supra note 23, at
202 (stating that § 20(a) assumed degree of fault on part of controlling person and simply
provided defense to shield controlling person from liability when he was without fault, but
suggesting that that did not compel conclusion that Congress designed control provisions to
preempt all other theories for imputation of common-law liability) and Kuehnle, supra note
21, at 351-54 (asserting that legislative history of controlling person provisions does not
support reading of restrictions on agency liability).
192. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1451-52 (pointing to § 20(a) and noting fact
that Congress chose to impose forms of secondary liability in some contexts and not in
others, which indicates deliberate congressional choice with which courts should not inter-
fere).
193. See infra note 194 (summarizing commentators' arguments in opposition to con-
clusion that controlling person provisions preempt common-law liability).
194. See 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 133, at 4477 (interpreting §§ 15 and 20(a) and
concluding that Congress intended for these provisions to extend liability beyond that
recognized at common law); Gottesman, supra note 23, at 202 (asserting that interpretation
of §§ 15 and 20(a) as preempting common-law liability would run counter to principle that
Congress designed securities laws to complement common-law liability); Kuehnle, supra note
21, at 353 (asserting that because nothing in language of controlling person provisions ex-
cludes agency liability or applies affirmative defense to agency liability, proponents of
exclusion have burden of showing congressional intent not expressed in plain language).
Kuehnle's analysis, however, is counter to that asserted by the Court in Central Bank.
Kuehnle infers that because Congress did not explicitly limit common-law liability, Congress
did not intend to restrict the common-law remedies available. Id. at 253-54. The Central
Bank Court, on the other hand, focused not on congressional silence with regard to aiding and
abetting under § 10(b) but instead focused on the fact that Congress, when it enacted § 10(b),




Central Bank,195 indeed, the Central Bank Court acknowledged that imposmg
civil liability for aiding and abetting might be good policy 196 But the issue
was not whether implying a cause of action constituted a good or bad policy;
the issue was whether the text of Section 10(b) explicitly created liability
for aiding and abetting. 'I Consequently, despite the policy arguments that
may exist to the contrary, the Court's method of statutory interpretation
suggests that actions based on common-law vicarious liability should no
longer exist when the defendant is able to comply with Section 20(a)'s good-
faith defense.
B. Aiding and Abetting Under RICO
1. RICO and the Lower Federal Courts
In 1970, Congress enacted RICO 9' to curb the infiltration of organized
crime into legitimate businesses."9 RICO is relevant to securities law be-
cause plaintiffs frequently add a civil RICO claim to their complaints when
filing federal and state securities fraud suits.' Like Section 10(b), Section
195. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's strict
adherence to § 10(b)'s text in determining whether Congress intended to encompass aiding
and abetting liability under § 10(b)).
196. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448.
197 Id. Additionally, in Central Bank, the SEC, as amicus curiae, contended that
numerous policy arguments existed m favor of implying an aiding and abetting cause of action
under § 10(b). Id. at 1453. Notably, the SEC urged that the 1934 Act needed such a cause
of action to ensure that the Act made the defrauded plaintiffs whole. Id. The Court dis-
missed the SEC's policy arguments and noted contrary policy arguments of its own. Id. at
1453-54. The Court reasoned that because far-reaching liability increases costs, unplying
secondary liability may actually perform a disservice to the goals of fair dealing and effi-
ciency in the securities markets. Id. at 1454; see Frankel, supra note 112, at 578 (com-
menting that broad scope of liability may deter issuance of public securities and hinder
investment). Vicarious liability also rests on the policy that courts should make injured
persons whole. See KEEroN ET AL., supra note 131, § 69, at 500 (noting that vicarious liabil-
ity rests on presumption that innocent employer should bear costs as opposed to innocent
injured plaintiff); Gottesman, supra note 23, at 186 (commenting that courts allocate liability
under respondeat superior because distribution of loss is commercially and socially reason-
able). Consequently, Central Bank's rejection of the SEC's policy argument strikes at the
foundation supporting strict common-law vicarious liability.
198. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988) (enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48).
199. See generally Statement of Findings and Purpose of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23 (stating that among-other effects,
organized crime had infiltrated and corrupted legitimate businesses).
200. See, e.g., Reves v Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1168 (1993) (asserting both
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1962 of RICO uses the words "directly and indirectly" to describe the scope
of prohibited conduct. 0 Just as lower federal courts used criminal and tort
common-law principles to increase the liability under Section 10(b), courts
have used these same principles to increase significantly the number of
persons subject to civil RICO liability I The Court's method of statutory
securities law violations and claims based on civil RICO); Craighead v E.F Hutton & Co.,
899 F.2d 485, 493-94 (6th Cir. 1990) (same); Moss v Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 18
n. 13 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that plaintiffs may bring garden-variety securities fraud claims
under civil RICO), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); Knight v E.F Hutton & Co., 750
F Supp. 1109, 1111 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (asserting both securities law violations and claims
based on civil RICO); Pincetich v Jeanfreau, 699 F Supp. 1469, 1472 (D. Or. 1988) (same);
Hybert v Shearson Lehman/Am. Express Inc., 688 F Supp. 320, 323 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(same); see also Arthur F Mathews, Shifting the Burden of Losses in the Securities Markets:
The Role of Civil RICO in Securities Litigation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv 896, 897-98 (1990)
(commenting that RICO is becoming alternative statute of choice to federal securities statutes
as plaintiffs search for "deep pockets"); Mark S. Poker, Reaching a Deep Pocket Under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 72 MARQ. L. Rnv 511, 512 (1989)
(noting that major source of RICO claims originate from common business and financial
relationships); Diane L. Virzera, Redirecting the Debate on "Garden Variety" Abuses of Civil
RICO: Suitability Rule Violations and the Case for Treble Damages, 26 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 341, 341-43 (1993) (describing rise of RICO claims in securities suits).
201. See § 1962 of RICO which states:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a
principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of,
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity
or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection
of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsection (a), (b) or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988) (emphasis added).
202. See, e.g., Cox v Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1410 (11th
Cir. 1994) (recognizing civil RICO liability for aiding and abetting and using same common-
law tort elements as used by courts involved in securities cases), modified, 30 F.3d 1347,
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 900 (1995); Petro-Tech, Inc. v Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d
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interpretation m Central Bank should govern claims of civil aiding and
abetting under RICO in order to prevent plaintiffs from simply switching
their clanis from Section 10(b) to Section 1962 of RICO Plaintiffs should
not be able to bring a charge of racketeering more easily than a charge of
securities fraud.'3
2. Applying Central Bank to RICO
Central Bank instructs that the starting point for determining the scope
of prohibited conduct under a statute begins with the text of the statute
itself.' Because Section 10(b) does not include the words "aid" and "abet,"
the Court concluded that aiding and abetting conduct could not create 10(b)
liability 2 Similarly, the words "aid" and "abet" do not appear in RICO
Section 1962.o Section 1962(a), however, does make reference to the
criminal aiding and abetting statute.' Therefore, although Congress did not
actually use the'words "aid" and "abet," Congress's reference to the criminal
aiding and abetting statute may constitute sufficient evidence of Congress's
intent to create liability for aiding and abetting under Section 1962(a)."o 8
1349, 1361 (3d Cir. 1987) (inferring civil aiding and abetting under § 1962(a), but not under
§ 1962(c)); Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475, 485-87 (5th
Cir. 1986) (using criminal standard articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 2 for civil aiding and abetting
action); Rodriquez v Banco Cent., 727 F Supp. 759, 773 (D.P.R. 1989) (recognizing civil
aiding and abetting theory under RICO); San Jacinto Sav Ass'n v TDC Corp., 707 F Supp.
1579, 1582 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (same); WAIT Radio v Price Waterhouse, 691 F Supp. 102,
108 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (commenting that common-law doctrine of aiding and abetting, like
vicarious liability, can apply to RICO if other RICO criteria are met); see also DOUGLAS E.
ABRAMS, THE LAW OF CIVIL RICO § 4.9.2, at 256-58 (1991) (describing aiding and abetting
under RICO).
203. See Bowdom Constr. Corp. v Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 869 F Supp.
1004, 1009 (D. Mass. 1994) (noting that it should not be easier to bring racketeering claim
than securities fraud claim) (citing New Eng. Data Servs. v Becher, 829 F.2d 286, 291 (1st
Cir. 1987)).
204. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447 (using text of § 10(b) to define scope of
liability); Reves v Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (1993) (looking first to statute's
text in civil RICO suit); see also Frankfurter, supra note 101, at 535 (suggesting statutory
interpretation must begin with statute's text).
205. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448.
206. See supra note 201 (providing text of § 1962).
207 See supra note 201 (providing text of § 1962(a)).
208. See Judith L. Rosenthal, Comment, Aiding and Abetting Liability for Civil Viola-
lions ofRICO, 61 TEMP L.Q. 1481, 1505 (1988) (noting that only subsection (a) of § 1962
references criminal aiding and abetting statute).
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Courts, however, should not draw a similar inference with respect to
the other subsections included under Section 1962.'o Instead, lower courts
should employ the same interpretive principle used by the Court in Central
Bank. The Court reasoned that the inclusion of secondary liability in one
provision indicated the conscious intent to exclude secondary liability from
others.10 Section 1962(a)'s unique reference to the criminal aiding and
abetting statute indicates that courts should confine aiding and abetting to
that subsection.2 ' Moreover, Section 1962(d) creates secondary liability
based on conspiracy 212 In Central Bank, the Court referenced Section 20(a)
of the 1934 Act, which creates a form of secondary liability, and concluded
that congressional inclusion of one form of secondary liability suggested that
when Congress wished to create secondary liability, Congress did so.
2 13
Thus, the Central Bank rationale suggests that one draw the same conclusion
between Section 1962(d) and the other subsections: Congress knew how -to
and chose to extend liability based on conspiracy, but not on other forms of
secondary liability, such as aiding and abetting.
Finally, at least one lower court justified its recognition of aiding and
abetting liability based on Section 1962(c)'s imposition of liability for
"indirect" conduct." 4 In Central Bank, the Court expressly rejected this
209 See supra note 201 (providing text of § 1962(b)-(c)).
210. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (explaining that Central Bank Court
interpreted Congress's inclusion of form of secondary liability in § 20(a) as indication that
Congress did not intend there to be other forms of secondary liability in other provisions).
Examples exist of decisions in which lower courts did not draw a distinction between
§ 1962(a) and § 1962(b)-(d). See Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v SLT Warehouse Co., 782
F.2d 475, 485-86 (5th Cir. 1986) (making no distinction among subsections of § 1962 when
discussing aider and abettor liability); United States v Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
780 F.2d 267, 270 (3d Cir. 1985) (linking aiding and abetting to violations of § 1962(b) and
(d) even though neither contains reference to aiding and abetting statute), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1140 (1986); Rodriquez v. Banco Cent., 727 F Supp. 759, 773 (D.P.R. 1989) (making
no distinction among subsections of § 1962 when discussing aider and abettor liability); San
Jacito Sav Ass'n v TDC Corp., 707 F Supp. 1579, 1582 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (same); WAIT
Radio v Price Waterhouse, 691 F Supp. 102, 108 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (same); GLM Corp. v
Klein, 684 F Supp. 1242, 1246-47 (S.D.N.Y 1988) (same).
211. See Rosenthal, supra note 208, at 1505 (noting that courts considering aiding and
abetting under civil RICO have not made distinction that reference to criminal aiding and
abetting only occurs in subsection (a)).
212. See supra note 201 (providing text of § 1962(d)).
213. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1451-52 (drawing conclusion that Congress's
explicit inclusion of secondary liability in another provision of 1934 Act indicated
congressional choice to exclude secondary liability under § 10(b)).
214. See Rodriquez v Banco Cent., 727 F Supp. 759, 773-74 (D.P.R. 1989) (noting
that § 1962(c) contemplates civil RICO liability for "indirect" participation and therefore
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argument. 2 5 The Court stated that Section 10(b)'s phrase "directly or in-
directly" does not extend liability to those who aid and abet the primary
violator.216 Consequently, the Central Bank decision not only affects and
limits the actionable conduct under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, but its
logic, when applied to civil RICO claims, also seriously undermines the
claim of aiding and abetting under Section 1962.27
IV Central Bank: Shaping Communication Between the
Judicial and Legislative Branches
Not only does the Court's method of statutory interpretation undermine
other long-standing causes of action such as conspiracy and vicarious
liability,18 Central Bank has a profound effect on the communication among
various participants m the American system of government. 2'9 Central Bank
provides judges with a methodology to use when deciding whether to imply
a cause of action, but the Court's method of analysis also imposes upon
holding that person may be liable under § 1962(c) by means of aiding and abetting pattern of
predicate acts).
215. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447-48.
216. Id. at 1447; see supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court's rejection of First Interstate's and SEC's argument that phrase "directly or indirectly"
in § 10(b) extended liability to aiding and abetting conduct).
217 See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text (acknowledging that cause of action
for aiding and abetting under § 1962(a) may survive Central Bank attack).
218. See supra notes 136-56, 171-97 and accompanying text (applying Central Bank
analysis to conspiracy and vicarious liability under § 10(b) and concluding that Central Bank
places these claims in jeopardy).
219. There exists broad debate over the constitutionality of the Supreme Court's decision
to deny a cause of action when Congress has not specifically provided for one in the statutory
text. See generally George D. Brown, Of Activism and Erie - The Implication Doctrine's
Implications for the Nature and Role of the Federal Courts, 69 IOwA L. Rlv 617 (1984)
(discussing Justice Powell's and Chief Justice Rehnquist's emphasis on law of separation of
powers in their reluctance to imply causes of action); Foy, supra note 69 (reviewing Court's
movement away from implying causes of action based on separation of powers concerns, but
noting that traditional purpose of courts was to give remedies for wrongs defined by
legislation); Linda S. Green, Judicial Implication of Remedies for Federal Statutory Vio-
lations: The Separation of Powers Concerns, 53 TEMP L.Q. 469 (1980) (contending that
judicial fashioning of remedies is inherently "judicial" and therefore is not violation of
separation of powers); Thomas W Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52
U. CHI. L. REv 1 (1985) (discussing separation of powers limitation on Supreme Court's
ability to imply causes of action); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legiti-
nacy, and the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw U. L. Rnv 761
(1989) (contending that Congress and not Supreme Court should make alterations in
preexisting legislation to remedy contemporary social problems).
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Congress a framework for communicating congressional intent if it decides
to override Central Bank.?' The Court has also shifted an intense debate
from federal courtrooms to Congress. Interested parties, who once argued
or filed amicus curiae briefs in federal courts, now debate with each other
and with lawmakers in the hearing rooms of Congress. 2 Finally, Central
Bank alters the interaction between private litigants and federal judges
because private plaintiffs must now allege different facts, and judges must
articulate to plaintiffs and to defendants what conduct remains actionable
under Section 10(b).'
A. Central Bank and Future Statutes
If Congress decides to override Central Bank, Congress must do so on
the Supreme Court's terms.' The Supreme Court focused almost exclu-
sively on the text of Section 10(b); thus, by merely adding the words "aid"
and "abet" to the text of Section 10(b), Congress can override Central Bank
and reinstate a private cause of action for aiding and abetting. 4 Yet if
Congress merely includes the words "aid" and "abet" in the text of Section
10(b), Congress will forego an opportunity to incorporate the ideas
generated by congressional debate into a statute.' Even when all the
circuits agreed that a cause of action for aiding and abetting existed under
220. See infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text (suggesting provisions that Congress
should include in statute if Congress chooses to override Central Bank).
221. See infra notes 232-47 and accompanying text (discussing debate in Congress).
222. See infra notes 248-58 and accompanying text (discussing fact that judges must draw
distinction between primary and secondary liability under § 10(b)).
223. Cf. Foy, supra note 69, at 570 (praising certainty and encouraging Court to make
decisions that tell members of Congress that if they want to create or deny private cause of
action, members must clearly say so to achieve that objective); Frankfurter, supra note 101,
at 545 (commenting that what courts do with legislation in turn affects what Congress will do
in future). Frankfurter noted that loose judicial reading makes for loose legislative writing.
Id., see also Cass R. Sunstem, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv L.
REV 407, 457 (1989) (noting that function of interpretative principles is to promote better
lawmaking). Sunstein stated that courts adhere to the "plain meaning" principle in statutory
interpretation probably in hopes that Congress will express itself more clearly in the future.
Id. Implicitly then, the literal textual reading in Central Bank should make lawmakers write
more crisply and with greater specificity
224. In the Senate on July 21, 1994, Senator Metzenbaum introduced Senate Bill No.
2306 that would ovemde Central Bank, but only by adding the words "aid" and "abet" to the
text of§ 10(b). See 140 CoNG. REc. S9446 (daily ed. July 21, 1994).
225. See infra notes 239-45 (discussing congressional debate over appropriateness and
parameters of aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b)).
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Section 10(b), differences remained as to the parameters of that claim. 6
Returning the aiding and abetting issue to the judiciary without further
clarification would once again require courts to trudge through the various
arguments; and again, courts would only resolve the debate incrementally 227
For example, courts would again face the debate over what kind of behavior
constitutes substantial assistance2 and what mental state in a defendant
creates aiding and abetting liability 9
Thus, mere insertion of the words "aid" and "abet" into the text of
Section 10(b) would clearly articulate Congress's intent to create liability for
this conduct; tis action, however, would neither incorporate the ideas
generated by congressional debate nor answer the questions that surrounded
aiding and abetting prior to Central Bank.' Consequently, if Congress
reinstates liability for aiding and abetting conduct under Section 10(b),
Congress should provide the following provisions: (1) a specific determina-
tion on whether the plaintiff can create liability by showing that the
defendant acted recklessly or whether the plaintiff must show that the
defendant knew that she was aiding the primary violator, (2) a description
about what may and may not constitute "substantial assistance," and (3) a
decision about whether courts should hold alders and abettors jointly and
severally liable to plaintiffs for damages caused by the Section 10(b)
violation or whether alders and abettors should only be proportionally liable
for the plaintiff's damage along with the primary violator.
Additionally, the Central Bank Court's method of statutory analysis
seriously undermines other common-law forms of secondary liability such
as conspiracy and vicarious liability "23 Consequently, Central Bank not only
226. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text (discussing differences among circuits
in their treatment of aiding and abetting cause of action under § 10(b)).
227 See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text (discussing differences among lower
federal courts as to what conduct aiding and abetting ought to include); see also infia notes
239-45 and accompanying text (discussing disagreements among commentators as to param-
eters of aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b)).
228. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (describing differences among circuits
about what factors courts emphasized when determining whether defendant substantially
assisted primary violator of § 10(b) so that defendant was liable as aider and abettor).
229. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (describing differences among circuits
about what mental state plaintiff had to prove to impose § 10(b) liability on defendant for
aiding and abetting).
230. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text (describing disagreements among
circuits about parameters of aiding and abetting cause of action under § 10(b)).
231. See supra notes 136-56, 171-97,204-17 and accompanying text (discussing Central
Bank ramifications on other implied causes of action).
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forces Congress to address the narrow issue of aiding and abetting under
Section 10(b), but the decision also requires that Congress make clear its
intent to include or exclude these other forms of secondary liability
Otherwise, because of the Court's textual emphasis, these claims may
disappear even if Congress enacts a statute expressly extending 10(b) liability
to aiding and abetting.
B. Central Bank: Molding the Debate in Congress
Many commentators and lawmakers have vehemently criticized the
Court's rejection of the implied aiding and abetting action under Section
10(b).23 2 Yet no one - not even Justice Stevens, who wrote the Central
Bank dissent - contends that Section 10(b)'s text encompasses aiding and
abetting conduct. 3 Blanket criticism of the Central Bank decision thus fails
to acknowledge an important distinction: While it may be appropriate, and
in fact desirable, for the judiciary to imply a private cause of action to
redress conduct expressly proscribed by Congress, it does not follow that the
judiciary should, in the absence of conduct proscribed by Congress, imply
and define a separate cause of action.'
With the Central Bank decision, the Court has invited Congress to
either respond with a statute that describes prohibited conduct or to remain
satisfied with the current state of Section 10(b) without aiding and abetting
liability and arguably without other forms of secondary liability " This
232. See House Hearing, supra note 113, at 235 (prepared statement of Mark J. Griffin,
Securities Division, Utah Department of Commerce) (suggesting that investors are consider-
ably worse off after Central Bank); id. at 235 (statement of Donald C. Langevoort, Lee S.
and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University) (finding Court's reasoning m
Central Bank unpersuasive, especially in its treatment ofjudicial precedent in lower courts);
Senate Hearing, supra note 34, at 1 (statement of Sen. Christopher J. Dodd) (noting common-
law foundation of aiding and abetting and stating that before Supreme Court changed
landscape, aiding and abetting was important tool in ensuring honesty and high professional
standards); 140 CONG. RPC. S9460 (daily ed. July 21, 1994) (statement of Sen. Howard M.
Metzenbaum) (characterizing Central Bank as result of bizarre legal reasoning).
233. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens's dissent
in Central Bank).
234. Cf. Michael P Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking and the
New Issues Market, 58 VA. L. REv 776, 801 (1972) (suggesting that predictability is most
important factor in assessing risks of legal liability and that parties assign high costs to those
perceived risks that are not only substantial but also indeterminate).
235. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text (describing Central Bank decision
and statutory analysis employed by Supreme Court). But cf. James J. Brudney, Congressio-
nal Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?,
93 MICH. L. REV 1, 17 (1994) (arguing that Court's theory that Congress can simply "do it
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invitation has led interested parties from the courtrooms to the congressional
hearing rooms - some m support of the Central Bank decision and some
seeking legislation to override the decision. 6 But unlike a judicial setting,
where the nature of our adversarial system limits nonparties to amcus briefs
on narrow issues, 2 7 congressional subcommittees have permitted nonparties
to present a wide array of information and opinions about aiding and abetting
under Section 10(b) as well as other issues affecting securities regulation."
Those testifying before Congress have debated some of the same issues
that parties litigated piecemeal in the judiciary Just as the SEC, as anucus
curiae, differed from the majority in Central Bank, those who testified
before Congress have similarly disagreed about whether unposing broad
liability in the securities industry has a positive or negative impact upon
investors and those involved in capital formation. 9 Most witnesses have
better next time" discounts how resource intensive "next time" is likely to be). Professor
Brudney asserts that congressional time constraints are such that it is naive for the Court to
refuse to interpret legislative history and to demand that congressional intent be fully
encompassed within the text of the statute. Id. at 22; see also Note, supra note 150, at 905
(arguing that realities of legislative power constrain Congress from constant re-exammation
of all its statutes and thus that clear-statement policy foists upon Congress responsibility that
it cannot meet).
236. See House Heanng, supra note 113 (providing various commentators and interested
parties with chance to give their opinion on how Congress should proceed in wake of Central
Bank); Senate Heanng, supra note 34 (same); see also Hardon F Stone, The Common Law
in the United States, 50 HARV L. REV 4, 25 (1936) (using phrase "sober second thought"
when referencing congressional response to Supreme Court decisions).
237 See supra note 95-100 and accompanying text (noting that SEC had to submit
amicus brief in Central Bank case when SEC wanted to influence definition of aiding and
abetting liability).
238. See, e.g., House Heanng, supra note 113, at 265-66 (prepared statement of
Leonard B. Simon, on behalf of National Association of Securities and Commercial Law
Attorneys) (providing statistics that undermine Supreme Court's assumption that securities
litigation results in harm to securities formation); id. at 235, 245-46 (prepared statement of
Mark J. Griffin, Securities Division, Utah Department of Commerce) (suggesting that
Congress may want to investigate procedures currently provided to judiciary to deal with friv-
olous claims and advocating that Congress overrule Central Bank decision with legislation);
Senate Heanng, supra note 34, at 64 (prepared statement of Stuart J. Kaswell, senior vice
president and general counsel, Securities Industry Association) (praising Central Bank
decision and encouraging Congress to avoid "quick fix" on secondary liability and instead em-
phasizmg importance of continued comprehensive review of securities litigation system); id.
at 28 (statement of Eugene L. Goldman, partner, McDermott, Will & Emory) (asserting that
Central Bank decision provides Congress with opportunity to examine whole issue of varying
levels of liability for defendants in securities law suits).
239. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453-54 (reJecting SEC's policy arguments that
secondary liability is necessary to deter secondary actors from contributing to fraud and nec-
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contended that Congress should create aiding and abetting liability under
Section 10(b), but have disagreed among themselves over the parameters of
that liability
Moreover, like those appearing before lower federal courts, those testi-
fying before Congress disagreed over the types of evidence that plaintiffs
must assert to sustain a cause of action for aiding and abetting."' Some
urged Congress to adopt a liberal definition of aiding and abetting under
Section 10(b) by, for example, encouraging Congress to explicitly sanction
a plaintiff's reliance on a showing of recklessness to create liability m the
defendant.2" 1 Others countered by encouraging Congress to create a stricter
essary to ensure that courts make defrauded parties whole). The Central Bank Court struck
down the argument that broad-based civil liability under federal securities laws would better
serve the objectives of the statute. Id. at 1454. The Court, instead, noted that securities liti-
gation was an area that demanded a degree of certainty and predictability Id. The Court
reasoned that the uncertainty surrounding the governing rules of aiding and abetting caused
defendants to abandon substantial defenses and incur large settlement expenses. Id. The
Court concluded that instead of helping the intended beneficiaries of the securities laws,
having uncertain causes of action actually hurt investors because professionals passed the
increased costs along to investors. Id.
A representative of the Securities Industry Association made an analogous argument
before a Senate subcommittee following the Central Bank decision. See Senate Hearing,
supra note 34 (prepared statement of Stuart J. Kaswell, senior vice president and general
counsel, Securities Industry Association). Kaswell argued that secondary liability had an
especially deleterious effect on capital formations because its contours were vague and elastic.
Id. at 66. Kaswell contended that professionals like accountants and attorneys inevitably
charged higher fees because of the possibility that a plaintiff would make a claim that they
were secondarily liability Id. Kaswell reasoned that this in turn made it more difficult for
new or innovative businesses to raise capital. Id.
Others, however, presented evidence that undermined the assertion that the imposition of
secondary liability has harmed capital formation. See House Hearing, supra note 113, at 238-
39 (prepared statement of Mark J. Griffin, Securities Division, Utah Department of
Commerce) (presenting evidence that securities industry has incurred no harm in terms of
capital formation). Griffin noted that over the last 20 years, stock offerings and stock trading
have increased dramatically Id. at 238.
240. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text (describing differences among circuits
m terms of evidence required by plaintiffs to sustain a cause of action for aiding and abetting
under § 10(b)).
241. See House Hearng, supra note 113, at 291 (prepared statement of Leonard B.
Simon, on behalf of National Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys)
(asserting that exemption for reckless conduct was manifestly unfair to fraud victims). Simon
argued that if an accountant, lawyer, or some other professional acted recklessly and thus
furthered a fraud, he or she ought to be liable to defrauded victims. Id., see also Senate
Hearng, supra note 34, at 72 (prepared statement of Harvey J. Goldschmid, Dwight Profes-
sor of Law, Columbia University) (encouraging Congress to consider showing of recklessness
as sufficient to satisfy scienter requirement under § 10(b)).
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form of aiding and abetting liability by aligning the required elements more
closely with those necessary to establish a primary violation. For example,
some disfavored a plaintiff's showing of recklessness and argued that courts
should only impose aiding and abetting liability if the plaintiff shows that the
defendant rendered knowing assistance or deliberately disregarded the
truth.242 Another suggestion that would create a stricter form of aiding and
abetting liability was that aiding and abetting liability should attach only
when the plaintiff is able to show that he relied on the defendant's
conduct.' 3 Finally, some testified that secondary defendants should remain
jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs along with the primary violator,
244
while others maintained that a secondary defendant's liability should be
proportional to that of the primary violator.2 5
242. See House Hearing, supra note 113, at 126 (prepared statement of Donald C.
Langevoort, Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University) (favoring
restoration of private aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b) but urging creation of liability
for ancillary participation only when participant rendered knowing assistance or deliberately
disregarded truth); Senate Hearing, supra note 34, at 74 (prepared statement of Eugene L.
Goldman, partner, McDermott, Will & Emory) (worrying that courts align "recklessness"
standard too closely with concepts of negligence and therefore jeopardize participation in
routine business transactions).
243. See Senate Hearing, supra note 34, at 74 (prepared statement of Eugene L. Gold-
man, partner, McDermott, Will & Emory) (stating that specific standard for imposing aiding
and abetting liability should include reliance requirement). The inclusion of a reliance
requirement as an element 'of aiding and abetting would essentially eliminate aiding and
abetting liability as it existed in lower courts prior to Central Bank and would force plaintiffs
to prove a primary violation. See also Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1449 (noting that SEC's
and First Interstate's argument would impose § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability on
defendant without proof of reliance). Compare supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text
(providing discussion of aiding and abetting liability prior to Central Bank) with infra notes
254-57 and accompanying text (describing elements of primary violation under § 10(b)).
244. See House Hearing, supra note 113, at 242-43 (prepared statement of Mark J.
Griffin, Securities Division, Utah Department of Commerce) (arguing that critics of joint and
several liability were forgetting that purpose of securities system is to protect rights of
defrauded investors). Griffin argued that when forced to choose between innocent investors
and professionals who knowingly or recklessly assisted the fraud, those professionals - not
innocent investors - should bear the risk of financial loss. Id., see also id. at 156 (statement
of Arthur R. Miller, Bruce Bromley Professor of Law, Harvard University) (noting that
elimination of joint and several liability would weaken the compensatory purpose and
effectiveness of private securities actions).
245. See id. at 126 (prepared statement of Donald C. Langevoort, Lee S. and Charles
A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University) (noting that restoration of § 10(b) aiding
and abetting should only create proportionate liability for aider and abettor instead of joint
and several liability); id. at 90 (prepared statement of Joel Seligman, Professor of Law,
University of Michigan) (advocating restoration of aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b),
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When critiquing the Court's method of statutory interpretation, one
must consider the extensive debate and diversity of opinions that have sur-
'faced in congressional hearings since Central Bank. Although persuasive
arguments exist against the Court's use of strict textualism in statutory
analysis,' with regard to securities regulation and to the creation of
secondary liability specifically, the Court's use of this method in the
securities context may not be all bad. The extensive debate and diversity of
opinions suggest that Congress, not the Court, remains the better forum in
which to sort through the policy arguments to decide whether Section 10(b)
should include a cause of action for aiding and abetting and to define the
parameters of any claim. 7  Thus, the Court has given Congress - the
branch with the procedures to hear and respond to this broad debate - the
opportunity to enact a comprehensive statute instead of relying on the
judiciary for such work.
C. A Difficult Line to Draw
While Central Bank leaves Congress with the task of determining
whether to create secondary liability under Section 10(b), Central Bank
creates a much different situation among lower courts. For the first time in
thin-ty years, lower courts must draw a clear distinction between primary and
secondary liability under Section 10(b). In Central Bank, the Court stated
that any person or entity, even those who have traditionally faced claims
based on secondary liability, could be liable as a primary violator of Section
10(b) if a plaintiff meets all the requirements to create primary liability 24
The.Court, however, noted that those who only aid and abet cannot be
subject to 10(b) liability because, by definition, aiders and abettors do not
but asserting that Congress should limit aiders and abettors to proportionate liability except
in circumstances of insolvent primary violator whose damages are not adequately insured).
246. See Brudney, supra note 235, at 57 (suggesting that requiring Congress to expand
its text would probably not result in better job of statutory drafting, but instead, in effort to
add details and illustrations, text would likely become more precise but less coherent); Lune-
burg, supra note 116, at 217 (noting that clear-statement techniques of statutory interpretation
function m part to free court from its duty to abide by results of its investigation into meaning
of statute); Sunstem, supra note 223, at 416 (stating that textualist approach m its purest form
is inadequate because meaning of words, whether plain or not, depends on both culture and
context).
247 See Luneberg, supra note 116, at 220 (noting that Court's adherence to clear state-
ment method of statutory interpretation tends to force Congress to directly and expressly
address issue in way that focuses its public responsibility for action).
248. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455.
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engage in any of the activities proscribed by Section 10(b). 9 One com-
mentator has noted that Central Batik may create a litigation morass because
the Court created the need to draw this distinction, but failed to provide
lower courts with a guide as to where the line between a primary and
secondary violation exists.' During the thirty years that the cause of action
for aiding and abetting existed, courts gave little attention to the distinction
between primary and secondary liability because both classes of actors were
jointly and severally liable for the Section 10(b) violation. s'
In an effort to avoid the confusion, judges should adhere strictly to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) (Rule 9(b))5 and communicate to
plaintiffs that courts will dismiss claims that they would have once sustained
under Section 10(b) unless the plaintiff can demonstrate with particularity
that the defendant's conduct constitutes a primary violation. Strict use of
Rule 9(b) will ughlight the marked differences between the general elements
necessary to allege secondary participation and the elements required to
allege a primary violation because Rule 9(b) forces the plaintiff to clearly
distinguish and communicate these differences." 3  In the past, plaintiffs
asserting a claim of aiding and abetting had to plead with particularity, but
only as to (1) whether there was a primary violation, (2) whether the accused
aider-abettor had general awareness that his conduct was improper, and
249. Id. at 1447
250. Senate Heanng, supra note 34, at 72 (statement of Harvey J. Goldschmd, Dwight
Professor of Law, Columbia University); see supra note 14 (providing text of § 10(b)).
251. See Senate Hearng, supra note 34, at 52-53 (prepared statement of Donald C.
Langevoort, Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University) (noting
that courts hold both primary and secondary defendants jointly and severally liable for § 10(b)
violation).
252. See FED. R. Civ P 9(b), which provides: "In all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity Malice,
intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally "
253. See supra note 252 (providing text of Rule 9(b)); see also House Heanng, supra
note 113, at 79 (prepared statement of Joel Seligman, Professor of Law, University of
Michigan) (arguing that courts have been effective in their use of Rule 9(b) to weed out
nonmeritorious lawsuits); cf. id. at 123 (prepared statement of Donald C. Langevoort, Lee
S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University) (proposing that Congress
empower courts to conduct evidentiary hearing at outset of case in which plaintiffs have to
show significant likelihood of success on merits). Professor Langevoort proposed the creation
of an evidentiary hearing in securities cases. Id. Courts would not require plaintiffs to show
that success is more likely than not, but plaintiffs would have to show that the case is more
than speculative. Id. Langevoort asserted that unlike the current 9(b) motion, the hearing
should be evidentiary so that courts do not have to accept the plaintiffs' allegations at face
value. Id.
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(3) whether the accused aider-abettor substantially assisted the primary
wrongdoer.2 By contrast, plaintiffs who now attempt to create primary
liability face a higher threshold because the elements for a primary violation
are significantly more stringent. To avoid a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff
must set forth particular facts establishing that (1) the defendant misrepre-
sented or omitted material facts or engaged in some other fraudulent device,
(2) the defendant purchased or sold securities in connection with the
fraudulent device, (3) the defendant acted with the required mental state
when making the misrepresentation or onmssion,' 5 (4) the plaintiff justifiably
relied on the misstatement or omission, 2 6 and (5) damages resulted from the
254. See, e.g., Farlow v Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir.
1992) (applying common-law tort elements of aiding and abetting); Levine v Diamanthuset,
Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Schatz v Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 495
(4th Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992); Fine v American Solar King
Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 300 (5th Cir. 1990) (same), cert. disnussed sub nom. Hurdman v Fine,
502 U.S. 976 (1991); Schlifke v Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 947 (7th Cir. 1989) (same);
Schneberger v Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477, 1480 (11th Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1091 (1989); Moore v Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Cleary v Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983) (same);
International Inv Trust v Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980) (same); Monsen v
Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
930 (1978); see also Ruder, supra note 23, at 620 (describing common-law elements of aiding
and abetting).
255. See Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (concluding that courts
should not sustain private cause of action for damages under § 10(b) in absence of allegation
of "scienter"). In Hochfelder, the Court considered whether scienter was a necessary element
in an action under § 10(b). Id. at 193. The Court concluded that scienter was a necessary
element, but left open the issue of whether recklessness could satisfy this element. Id. at 193
n. 12. Since Hochfelder, most circuits have held that recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the
scienter requirement. See, e.g., McLean v Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197-98 (3d Cir.
1979) (accepting showing of recklessness to satisfy scienter requirement in § 10(b) action);
Hoffman v Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 516-17 (1st Cir.) (accepting plaintiffs showing
of recklessness, but defining recklessness conservatively), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978);
First Va. Bankshares v Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1312 (5th Cir. 1977) (including "reckless"
within definition of what behavior is necessary to maintain § 10(b) action), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 952 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); see also CLARK, supra note 6, § 8.10.3, at 266
(noting that Supreme Court's decision in Hochfelder requiring allegation of scienter to support
cause of action for damages under § 10(b) removed large class of threats to professional firms
like accountants and lawyers).
256. See CentralBank, 114 S. Ct. at 1449 (emphasizing § 10(b)'s reliance element) (cit-
ing Basic Inc. v Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988)). The Central Bank Court commented
that the fact that an action for aiding and abetting would impose 10(b) liability even when the
plaintiff failed to establish reliance confirmed the Court's reasoning not to extend § 10(b) to
include conduct for aiding and abetting. Id., see also CLARK, supra note 6, § 8.10.5, at 329
1438
CENTRAL BANK
defendant's misstatement, omission, or fraudulent device.2
Because of the high cost of litigation,"8 judges should require plaintiffs
to communicate clearly that defendants' conduct is still actionable, even after
Central Bank. Mere dismissal of the aiding and abetting count after trial, or
even after discovery, without a careful preliminary inquiry at the pleading
stage into whether the plaintiff can sustain a claim under Section 10(b) will
not alleviate the costs defendants currently face. If courts allow plaintiffs
simply to manipulate the complaint without substantially changing the facts
alleged, defendants will suffer unjustly because they will incur litigation
expense and settlement pressures for conduct the Supreme Court has said
Congress does not proscribe.
V Conclusion
The Supreme Court's emphasis on the text of Section 10(b) in Central
Bank has both negative and positive ramifications. The Supreme Court's
analysis abolishes thirty years of judicial precedent and calls into question
other established claims, such as conspiracy and vicarious liability under
Section 10(b) and aiding and abetting under RICO. Thus, the Court has
undermined concepts of judicial precedent and stability
Prior to Central Bank, however, the parameters of liability under
Section 10(b) were unclear. Lower courts had developed an extensive body
of law surrounding aiding and abetting liability, but Congress had taken no
part in that development. Consequently, courts were exhausting judicial
resources and defendants were incurring costs for suits involving conduct not
(noting that proof of reliance forms part of causal chain from violation to injury); Louis Loss
&JOELSELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1051 (3d ed. 1995) (same).
See generally Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88
HARv L. REv 584 (1975) (discussing § 10(b)'s reliance requirement).
257 See Warren v Reserve Fund, Inc., 728 F.2d 741, 744 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying
element requirement to determine whether primary liability exists); Schlick v Penn-Dixie
Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 378-81 (2d Cir. 1974) (discussing elements of §10(b) claim and
whether plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to support that claim), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976
(1975); Weitzman v Stein, 436 F Supp. 895, 902-04 (S.D.N.Y 1977) (same); see also
Mary Siegel, The Interplay Between the Implied Remedy Under Section 10(b) and the Express
Causes of Action of the Federal Securities Laws, 62 B.U. L. REV 385, 393-94 (1982)
(describing substantive requirements for § 10(b) actions).
258. See 138 CONG. REC. S12605 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statement of Sen. Sanford).
Senator Sanford asserted that litigation under § 10(b) requires secondary actors to expend
large sums. Id. The Senator noted that in 83% of the § 10(b) cases, major accounting firms,
who are often the target of secondary claims, paid eight dollars in legal fees for every dollar
paid in claims. Id.
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proscribed by Congress. Therefore, although a strict textualist approach to
statutory interpretation warrants criticism in some circumstances, the Court's
use of this approach m Central Bank should not receive blanket criticism.
The approach has threatened judicial precedent and stability to a certain
extent, but at the same time, the decision has triggered broad debate in
Congress. Consequently, even those who strongly oppose the decision may
present their positions to Congress where the procedures are such that
Congress can respond comprehensively to the arguments made. If those
interested can convince a majority of the members of Congress to override
Central Bank, the Supreme Court's textually oriented approach dictates that
those members respond comprehensively by defining the parameters of
aiding and abetting and by making clear their intent with regard to other
forms of secondary liability, such as conspiracy and vicarious liability
If a majority does not develop in support of overriding Central Bank,
the decision will indeed strike a severe blow to those who believe that
secondary liability is an essential component of securities regulation. Yet,
for others who believe that courts should not expend judicial resources and
that defendants should not have to defend actions for conduct not proscribed
by Congress, Central Bank will prove to be a welcome decision.
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